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Being the largest guerrilla group in Colombia and entitled the richest guerrilla group of the 
world, the FARC-EP constitutes the most important non-state conflict actor of the 
Colombian internal conflict. In recent years it has been recognised in conflict research that 
non-state actors must be taken seriously if we want to understand today’s internal conflicts. 
This is the starting point for my analysis of the FARC-EP.  
 Whereas much contemporary research focuses on the economic agendas of conflict 
actors, the attention in this thesis is on how different organisational resources together 
reflect a social order of violence beyond the state that embraces both political, economic and 
symbolic elements. It asks the question of how organisational resources relate to and define 
internal legitimacy. Drawing upon Christopher Clapham and his notion of organisational 
effectiveness, indicators such as a clearly defined political project, effective structures and 
educated leaders will be employed as guiding lines in the empirical study of the FARC-EP. 
The grounds of the internal legitimacy of the FARC-EP will be established by combining 
these indicators with insight on the role of self-legitimation of rebels and Max Weber’s 
typology of domination.  
 The most effective self-legitimating arguments of an organisation may indeed reflect 
its most important organisational resources. By way of looking into the FARC-EP’s self-
legitimation, I find that one of its most important organisational resources is its historical 
memory. The FARC-EP’s sense of collective destiny is tied to stories of past suffering, in 
which the leader of the organisation holds a special position. As regards economic resources, 
there has been created a “revolutionary mysticism” of the way that economic resources are 
delegated, as well as a tight control over their management. Hence, the FARC-EP has 
managed to keep the economic resources a strength to the organisation, rather than a source 
of serious splits. 
  This thesis shows that in addition to internal structures, political project and level of 
education and coherence, effective self-legitimating arguments should be given special 
attention in order to understand the grounds of internal legitimacy of a specific non-state 
conflict actor. 
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Since Colombia’s war for independence (1810-1824), the country has gone through 
numerous civil wars. The Colombian conflict of today, which in recent years also has turned 
into a war1, is protracted, multifaceted and difficult to resolve. It is of great importance for 
the conflict’s possible resolution not to rely on easy conclusions labelling conflict actors 
without a deeper knowledge of their dynamics, which are not static but go through 
transformations.   
 My work is hence elaborated in the context of the latter acknowledgment, attempting 
at a better understanding of the conflict actor constituting Colombia’s largest guerrilla group, 
the Marxist-Leninist FARC-EP2. In today’s world, most conflicts are intrastate and therefore 
also involve non-state actors, who in some way or another need to obtain resources to 
subsist3. Much attention has accordingly been paid in recent years to the economic approach 
to conflict. Some theorists claim that war may play strategic roles when it comes to 
economic functions (Keen, 1996, 2000) and authority (Reno, 2000), establishing “alternative 
systems of profit and power” (Keen, 1996: 14). Others (Collier, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 
2001) focus more specifically on the importance of economic aspects as causes of conflict, 
arguing that  economic opportunity constitutes the most important likelihood for rebellion.  
 In the Colombian case, economic opportunity was not the cause of rebellion when it 
arose in the mid 20th century. Today, however, economic resources are crucial for the FARC-
EP to subsist, and it is entitled the richest guerrilla group of the world (Howe, 2001). 
Economic activities however do not comprise economic aspects only, for no human activity 
exists separately from its historical, political, and social context. Bakonyi and Stuvøy (2005) 
suggest that economic activities make up a form of social interaction. The FARC-EP can 
hence be seen as a social order of violence beyond the state whose establishment of 
legitimacy should be given special attention (Bakonyi and Stuvøy, 2005).  
  
 
                                                 
1 Armed conflict is defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program as “a contested incompatibility 
which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of 
which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”. An 
intermediate armed conflict results in at least 25 and fewer than 1000 battle-related deaths per year 
and an accumulated total of at least 1000 deaths, whereas war is defined as resulting in more than 
1000 battle-related deaths per year (Gleditsh et al., 2002: 619).  
2 The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia- People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia- Ejército del Pueblo)  
3 According to the UCDP, 25 of the 31 armed conflicts that were ongoing in 2005 were intrastate, 
whereas six were internationalised intrastate armed conflicts. In an ‘internationalised intrastate’ armed 
conflict the government, the opposition, or both sides receive military support from other governments 




My approach is therefore to study this order of violence through its organisational resources,  
with a focus on its economic, political and symbolic dimensions. These organisational 
resources make up the basis of the internal legitimacy of the social order in question. My 
research question is hence the following:  
 How do the FARC-EP’s organisational resources relate to and define the 
organisation’s internal legitimacy?  
 Accordingly, I will investigate how economic aspects interact with the non-economic 
resources that together constitute the basis of the internal legitimacy of the organisation. In so 
doing, I intend to look at its war economy as well as its organisational resources involving 
internal structure, identity and leadership. My claim is that these are crucial factors for the 
study of any guerrilla order. By means of literature mostly written by Colombian academics, 
but also  with the help of INGO documents, governmental reports, newspaper articles and 
personal testimonies, I will assess how this particular organisation creates internal legitimacy 
within its social order of violence.   
 
The Relevance to Peace Studies 
 
As pointed out by Rufin (2000: 22-26), non-state actors and their economic agendas must be 
taken seriously if we want to understand today’s internal conflicts. It is also important to 
recognise how economy interacts with other factors that settle a conflict actor’s stability and 
strength. In Colombia, the government’s recent strategy of concentrating a high number of 
troops in the FARC-EP’s strongholds has not defeated this guerrilla group. It has rather 
favoured strategies of the FARC-EP to conduct military attacks outside this area in order to 
distract the Army and create new areas of consolidation. For any future peace strategy to be 
successful, knowledge on what actually happens on the ground is therefore necessary.  
 Some would say that to study a ‘terrorist’ group4 is to approve of it. However, as 
Barker (2001: 11) recognises, “an historical or empirical study of legitimation requires an 
acknowledgement of the variety of human political values”, and he further adds that 
“normative aspirations should not prevent a study of a distinguishing feature (…)”. My 
intention here is to contribute to an enhanced understanding of a particular conflict actor, 
despite and because of its distinguishing features. In this study I employ indicators and 
theories for understanding how guerrilla groups are organised, in order to conduct an 
empirical study of the FARC-EP that can establish its basis of internal legitimacy. 
                                                 
4 The FARC-EP has been labelled as a terrorist organisation both by the U.S. and the E.U.  
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CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
Research Context  
 
Being Colombia’s largest guerrilla force, the FARC-EP5 is a very important object of study. 
It is an actor of a conflict that along with only a handful other conflicts in the world6 had the 
intensity of war in the year of 2005.  
 Internal conflicts persisted after the Cold War, although political and economic 
support to non-state conflict actors in the form that was known as ‘war by proxy’7 collapsed. 
Guerrilla groups were then led to adapt to a more business-oriented attitude (Rufin, 2000: 23-
24), and hence to establish war economies8. In the case of the FARC, foreign economic 
support has never been significant (Rangel, 2000: 582), but the group’s income has grown 
radically, especially after the coca boom in the second half of the 1980s (Gutiérrez, 2004: 
265). The FARC has demonstrated high skills in obtaining resources, enabling the group to 
recruit more members. It has established broad-based underground economies which invest 
both in illicit economies and within the country’s formal economy. Globalisation has 
facilitated resources to circulate, linking these to foreign markets and generating revenues in 
foreign currencies (Rangel, 2000: 577-78).  
 An economic approach to conflict is therefore highly relevant in the new context of 
civil wars, and research should cross the borders of the nation state. Non-state actors must be 
taken seriously, and no policy intervention can be made without a serious analysis of war 
economies in their particular contexts. Economy has namely never before played such a 
crucial role in war (Rufin, 2000: 22-26). However, conflicts are very complex social 
phenomena, which cannot be explained by one factor alone. My starting point was therefore a 
critique against conclusions drawn from quantitative studies undertaken by the World Bank 
concerning the risk of conflict. According to Collier and Hoeffler, who have done several 
                                                 
5 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- Ejército del Pueblo: “Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia- People’s Army”. The “-EP” was added to the group’s official name in 1982 (Ferro and 
Uribe, 2002: 35). In popular use the “-EP” is however absent, and since I also refer to the organisation 
in the years before 1982, I will refer to it as “the FARC” throughout my work. 
6 According to the UCDP, there were 31 armed conflicts in 2005, of which five could be categorised 
as wars: the ones taking place in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Nepal and Colombia (Harbom et al., 
2006: 618-19).  
7 During the Cold War some actors of internal conflict were given support by one of the two 
superpowers in order to destabilise forces operating in the zones of the other. This was for instance the 
case regarding UNITA and MPLA in Angola. 
8 A war economy is defined by Bakonyi and Stuvøy (2005) as a form of social organization dependent 
on both the existence of a system of domination and an economic structure guaranteeing the means for 
support of the system. The use or threat of use of force is employed in order to achieve access to and 
control over resources and labour. According to Le Billon (2000: 1), it is “the production, 
mobilisation, and allocation of economic resources to sustain a conflict (e.g. taxation, commerce or 
looting)”. 
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statistical analyses of all civil wars9 between 1960/1965 and 1999, the risk  of conflict is 
especially increased by a country’s dependency on primary commodity exports. Moreover, 
they argue that “it is the feasibility of predation which determines the risk of conflict” (Collier, 
2000:4). This feasibility is further defined by the percentage of a country’s gross domestic 
product represented by primary commodity exports; when this is around 28-32 %, the risk of 
conflict is at its highest (Collier, 2000: 4-6, Collier and Hoeffler, 2001: 8). This is explained 
by the fact that low dependence provides little incentive for rebel groups to capture rents, 
whereas high dependence, as for instance in Saudi Arabia, may result in a government so 
well-financed that rebellion is militarily infeasible (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001: 4).  
The conceptualisations of ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ were hence created, involving 
claims that rebels are motivated by self-enrichment rather than objective grievances. The 
greed account has been highly criticised (Keen, 2000; Ballentine, 2002; Guáqueta, 2002; 
Gutiérrez, 2004), and I also maintain that these findings are overly simplistic, leaving out 
grievance-related factors such as ethnic and religious divisions, horizontal inequality, and 
weak administrations. It is interesting that Max Weber at a 1910 meeting of the German 
Sociological Society stated the following (Weber cited in Swedberg, 1998: 54-55): 
 
I would like to protest the statement by one of the speakers that some one factor, be it 
technology or economy, can be the ‘ultimate’ or ‘true’ cause of another. If we look at the causal 
lines, we see them run, at one time, from technical to economic and political matters, at another 
from political to religious and economic ones, etc. There is no resting point. In my opinion, the 
view of historical materialism, frequently espoused, that the economic is in some sense the 
ultimate point in the chain of causes, is completely finished as a scientific proposition.  
 
As a matter of fact, Collier and Hoeffler later weakened their greed-thesis, emphasising to a 
higher degree the opportunity for organised violence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001: 3-6). They 
however admit that an opportunity can at the same time involve a motivation caused by 
grievance: Their indicator of foregone income10 of which the proxy of male secondary school 
enrolment is included, gives us a clue about opportunity for rebellion while at the same time 
it can be interpreted as an objective economic grievance (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001:4-5). It is 
obviously not clear whether greed and grievance be different phenomena, because grievances 
can involve a material motivation (Humphreys, 2003: 4). 
It does however seem plausible that local war economies influence the character, 
duration and intensity of internal conflicts (Ballentine, 2002: 267-73). Some empirical 
evidence states that wars tend to last longer when rebels finance themselves using illegal 
commodities (Fearon, 2004; Ross, 2004). Quantitative methods like the ones employed by 
Fearon and Ross are however similar to Collier and Hoeffler’s, transforming correlations into 
                                                 
9 A ‘civil war’ is also here defined as an internal conflict with one thousand or more battle- related 
deaths per year.  
10 ‘Foregone income’ here means the income forgone by joining a rebel group. According to Collier 
and Hoeffler (2001: 4), rebellions are more likely to occur when foregone income is unusually low.  
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wider assumptions without a deeper understanding of the complex mechanisms that underlie 
those correlations. Freely quoting Weber, “some one factor” (here illegal commodities) 
cannot “be the ‘ultimate’ or ‘true’ cause of another”. My concern with resources is 
consequently neither on type of resource nor on their correlations regarding the onset or 
duration of conflict, but on their significance within a social system.  
Keen (2000: 31-33) stresses the importance of understanding how greed and 
grievance interact, and together with Berdal (1997: 798-99) he also gives a framework of the 
functions of violence as political or non-political. Among the non-political functions are 
economic functions, security functions, and psychological functions. The political functions 
can be progressive or regressive, that is, working towards or against a diminution of political 
and economic inequalities. Reno11 also addresses non-political functions of violence that are 
nonetheless not directly related to ‘greed’, such as security functions. He claims that details 
of social relations of armed groups illustrate the variable nature of violence (Reno, 2004: 16). 
In his view, a closer examination of the social institutions shaping the range of opportunities 
available to armed actors is necessary in order to reach an understanding of the degree to 
which particular communities see the use of violence as legitimate. For example, he explains 
how the locally legitimate practice of young men’s initiation societies12 was an important 
factor in the recruitment and mobilisation of young men to the CDF militias in Sierra Leone, 
whose purpose of wartime behaviour was to guarantee each other’s security. Shared bonds of 
social reciprocity can be used as a basis for establishing order in a group; Reno therefore sees 
the importance of looking into how different political organisations are formed and 
maintained. This is crucial for international engagement in internal conflict to be successful, 
because people perpetrate violence and use resources in dramatically different ways. When 
                                                 
11 Reno especially deals with forms of authority and the category of collapsing states, and is well 
known within the literature for his concept of the ‘shadow state’. The concept involves a particular 
relationship between corruption and politics. In the shadow state, rulers in patronage-based  political 
systems choose to exercise political control through market channels rather than to build effective 
state institutions. Individuals must hence seek the ruler’s personal favour to secure his or her 
conditions (Reno, 2000: 44-48).  
12 In most African cultures, youth go through traditional initiation rites on their way to adulthood. The 
youngsters are taken away from the community by an elder to an isolated area, where they are taught 
about adulthood: male and female roles, the meaning of puberty, community traditions and relevant 
skills. Although these are not relevant details of social relations in the case of the FARC, this serves as 
an example of aspects other than economic that may motivate participation in a violent order. These 
shared social bonds could also possibly be used  to promote peace;  see for instance “Mozambique: 
Repairing the Ravages of War. Initiation Societies and Community Schooling”, IK Notes No. 33, June 
2001, to be found at 
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ik/iknt33.pdf#search=%22initiation%20societies%22, accessed 8 





this is not taken into account, international engagement sometimes does more bad than good 
(Reno, 2004: 1-23).  
Bakonyi and Stuvøy (2005: 359-82), taking a step further, provide an analytical 
framework of a social order of violence. They argue that prolonged wars are characterised by 
the emergence of social orders of violence beyond the state, and that economic activities are a 
form of social interaction. They have elaborated an analytical framework in which social 
orders can be systematised on a continuum according to their degree of institutionalisation of 
authority. A warlord system and a quasi-state system of violence are the two extremes on this 
continuum according to their degree of institutionalisation. The quasi-state system represents 
the most institutionalised social order, to the degree that it controls a specific territory and the 
economic resources within it. Such a system needs local support, which again requires the 
implementation of certain rules and norms. In order to underline its legitimacy, the system 
must also provide security and welfare-services, as well as an organisational apparatus with 
rationalised rules along with a partial bureaucratisation. As the forms of economic activities 
must be linked to sustainability concerns, it is expected that robbery and abductions do not 
represent prime economic activities in a quasi-state order of violence, and that violence is 
minimised because of the prominence of trade and production. The world-lord system, on the 
other hand, usually does not present complex political agendas, but draws its power position 
upon personal loyalties. A single warlord cannot stabilise political authority through the 
institutionalisation of legitimacy, but receives partial support from certain groups within his 
territory. This however results in frequent re-organisations of political authority, and makes it 
difficult for a centralised organisation of the economy to take place.  
All the systems of violence along this continuum, although very distinguishable, have 
important structural aspects in common. They should all be seen as determined by economic, 
political as well as symbolic aspects. When studying insurgent groups, therefore, special 
attention should be given to how they establish legitimacy, which will also enhance our 
understanding of the system’s level of institutionalisation of authority (Bakonyi and Stuvøy, 
2005: 359-60).  
 Ballentine argues that internal group attributes such as organisational resources, 
identity, leadership and economic resources work in combination with opportunity structures 
in the maintenance of large-scale collective action. She follows Tarrow’s definition of 
opportunity structures as “consistent- but not necessarily formal or permanent- dimensions of 
the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by 
affecting their expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow, cited in Ballentine, 2002: 281).  
 In view of the evolving discussion on economy and legitimacy, as well as the 
question of how political organisations are formed and maintained, I have decided to direct 
attention to the organisational resources, including economic, of the FARC. In line with 
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Bakonyi and Stuvøy’s framework, I  will see this guerrilla group as constituting a social 
order of violence beyond the state in which economic, political and symbolic aspects interact. 
I will look at the way that the FARC establishes legitimacy by analysing specific 
organisational resources of this social order of violence and by looking at its self-
legitimating discourse. In the next section I will explain what resources I specifically focus 
on, and how some of these are connected to one another. My overall approach therefore is to 
understand this non-state conflict actor by looking into its social institutions, norms, rules, 
and narratives, which constitute its basis of internal legitimacy and collective identity. These 
social parameters will then also be applied when investigating the economic activities of 




The question now is: how will I proceed in order to answer the research question on a micro 
level? I will here present the overall concept of organisational resources, and explain the 
specific parameters according to which I operationalise this concept in my study. Thereafter, I 
will discuss legitimation and legitimacy.  
 Legitimation as this concept is understood by Barker (2001) is an activity as opposed 
to the abstract quality of legitimacy. This activity of claiming legitimacy is indeed important 
for a belief in the legitimacy of an order to exist. Along with organisational resources it 
therefore also makes up a basis of internal legitimacy.  
 Max Weber’s concept of legitimate order, on the other hand, indicate correspondence 
between the type of domination and forms of administration in relation to legitimacy. 
Therefore Weber’s theory is a basis for the discussion of how the organisational resources 




Broadly speaking, organisational resources will be considered here as aspects that in some 
way or another contribute to organisational effectiveness. Consequently, these include both 
non-economic and economic resources, and will be accounted for below.  
 Most of the non-economic organisational resources will be operationalised according 
to Clapham’s indicators of organisational effectiveness. Clapham has analysed African 
insurgencies and has worked out some very interesting indicators of the extent to which a 
guerrilla group is organisationally effective. These indicators are in my view applicable to 
insurgencies also outside Africa, because they involve such universal organisational features 
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as leadership, education, effective structures, coherence, and discipline. Legitimacy to Weber 
is about whether the political power of the leadership is stable and effective within a certain 
order, and these indicators give some useful answers as to whether that is the case within the 
FARC. They can also help establish the level of institutionalisation of authority of the 
organisation. The indicators can be summarised in the following way (Clapham, 1998: 1-18):  
1) Educated leaders: A necessary, but not sufficient condition for organisational 
effectiveness. Disciplined movements need clearly defined political projects.  
2) The way in which the group develops or decays over time. The dispensability of 
the leader is here a crucial aspect.   
3) Common principles and goals, effective structures. Formal structures should 
possess some autonomy in order to be effective. Formalised training on the organisation, its 
aims and ideology is also crucial.  
4) Coherence: Ability to stay united. Splits are good indicators of the lines on which 
an organisation is organised- personalist movements tend to split on personal lines, ethnic 
movements on ethnic lines, etc.  
5) Level of discipline, included the level of discipline among child soldiers, and 
whether there are underlying social structures which permit the maintenance of a high level 
of discipline.  
6) Relations with the group’s host societies13 when it comes to: 
• ideologies and organisational models, or, as this is difficult to pin down, how the 
insurgent group relates to the disjunction between indigenous ethnicities and post-
colonial statehood.  
• whether the group has established itself in areas where the leader has his own origins.  
• the extent to which the relationship between the group and its host societies is of 
common interest. To what extent the group controls/exploits the population, or 
conversely, represents the aspirations of the population.  
• whether the members of the group live together with its host society on a daily basis, 
living and eating like the peasantry, and whether they are “bombed together”, which 
could  increase the level of solidarity between them.  
 The economic resources of the FARC will be addressed from the point of departure 
that the Colombian conflict is not caused by economic opportunities or greed, as in the 
economic approach to conflict represented by Collier and Hoeffler. Resources are however 
extremely important to this guerrilla group, and I will therefore look at the activities of its war 
                                                 
13 My focus is not primarily the relationship between the FARC and its host societies, but rather 
concerns internal structures. I will therefore only employ the last two of the indicators concerning 
relationship with host societies, because these are interesting in the discussion of the FARC’s war 
economy. 
 15 
economy; at its ways of extracting, reproducing and distributing economic resources. My 
main concern is that economic activities are important to the functioning of the social system 
of the FARC, and therefore, knowledge about these is necessary in order to comprehend how 
the system operates. I now turn to the concept of identity, which will facilitate a consideration 
of how economic activities are justified and legitimated within the FARC.  
 A sense of identity is another non-economic organisational resource that I will 
address in this thesis. A strong sense of collective identity contributes to Clapham’s indicator 
of coherence; to the ability to stay united. The aspect of identity embraces many concepts and 
questions, and in my investigation of the FARC it revolves around ‘social identity’, 
‘collective identity’, ‘narratives’, ‘memory-narratives’, and ‘historical identity’. Consequently, 
I find these important to account for here.  
 Social identity is defined by Tajfel (1981: 255) as “that part of an individual’s self-
concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups), 
together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership”. Tajfel 
admits that this is a limited definition of identity; it is a definition that assumes that some 
aspects of an individual’s view of him- or herself are contributed by the membership of social 
groups. As I am interested in the legitimation of one particular membership, that of the FARC, 
this definition serves my purposes of staying within the scope of the particular identity 
derived from such a membership. Affective and evaluative processes are here involved that 
arise from the felt attachment between the self and the in-group (Brewer, 2001: 21). When the 
in-group has been incorporated into the sense of self, and the self is experienced as an integral 
part of the in-group, social identification has taken place. Once this occurs at a high level, the 
group’s goals and welfare become connected to one’s own well-being. According to Tajfel 
(1981:255), one membership has then been preferred over others; although memberships may 
vary in salience over time and may constitute a function of a variety of social situations.  
My focus on identity construction within the FARC is an attempt to understand the 
group’s internal cohesion and its collective identity; not its legitimacy among the larger 
population. Leadership legitimation as well as the social identities from below merge together 
and create a collective identity of the group. This identity is related to that particular group’s 
‘common sense psychology’, which suggests a set of beliefs and explanations about causes in 
everyday life. What these explanations have in common is that they serve the function of 
legitimation. Narratives are therefore an important object of study: how people construct 
social reality and make inferences about causes in daily life. These explanations are to a large 
extent “historical”, in that they are specific to particular periods and tend to change over time 
(Moghaddam, 1998: 158-60). Narratives constitute a collection of stories, beliefs, aspirations, 
experiences, histories and current explanations that a group holds about itself and about its 
surroundings. They coherently interrelate historical and recent events and provide a larger 
 16 
meaning system into which social identities are incorporated (Salomon, 2004: 275-76). 
Interesting for how this meaning system develops are the hegemonial narratives provided by 
political leaders. Ahonen (1999) explains that the social constructions of memories are 
affected by public narratives, and that  memory-narratives can be reconstructed, changing the  
meanings of history. The reconstruction will be affected by new shared aspirations, and the 
memory-narratives become cultural tools in the construction of collective identity. 
Collective identities are namely constructed, not “primordial”, that is, they are not 
rooted strictly in collective experiences. They do however not come out of nothing; not just 
any cultural trait can be exploited in the formation of a group. The leadership of a social order 
when trying to evoke support has to base its discourse, its raw material, on people’s every day 
lives. Identification is relational, situational, and flexible, but at the same time it does not 
come out of thin air. A view opposing extreme instrumentalism is that social identity cannot 
be seen as a mere construct of ideology, because it in fact emerges from people’s personal 
experiences (Hylland Eriksen, 2001: 47-66). Movement entrepreneurs fashion their frames at 
the intersection between a target population’s culture and their own values and goals (Tarrow, 
1994: 123). They typically intend to downplay the difference between personal experiences 
and group history, merging these together in a credible way. Very often this “credible 
mixture” includes well developed myths of origin and past suffering (Hylland Eriksen, 2001: 
58, 61). Therefore, the group’s and the country’s history of personal and collective 
experiences is important, as will be shown later. In line with Hylland Eriksen (2001: 50-51) it 
is argued here that limitations form the objective foundations of social identification. There 
are namely aspects of identity that are not chosen, because one cannot do away with one’s 
lived history. These aspects are incorporated and implicit, and even if people relate to them as 
reflexive agents, they do so within limitations. 
 I will therefore look at the FARC’s self-legitimating discourse and the hegemonial 
narratives used within it: political symbolism and rhetoric that evoke personal experiences; as 
these are visible indicators revealing aspects of the FARC’s collective identity. In order to do 
this I will employ Barker’s perspective of archetypal rebel self-legitimation.  
 
The Self-Justifying Activities of Rulers, Staff and Subjects: Legitimation  
 
In his book Legitimating Identities, Rodney Barker addresses not the abstract quality of 
‘legitimacy’, but the activity of ‘legitimation’; the self-justifying activities of rulers, staff and 
subjects claiming legitimacy. Barker draws on what he calls “a neglected but central aspect of 
the work of Weber” (Barker, 2001: 13), who identified this activity of legitimation as distinct 
from the ascribed quality of legitimacy. The study of legitimation as Barker describes it does 
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not require judgements about moral worth or theological truths, nor of whether the activity of 
legitimation reflects a psychological need (Barker, 2001: 4, 21). 
 Weber identified legitimation as a defining characteristic of government whose 
character and manner of expression varied with the formal and substantive character of the 
regime (Barker, 2001: 13), which can be seen from the following quotation (Weber, 1968: 
953):   
  
For a domination, this kind of justification of its legitimacy is much more than a matter of 
theoretical or philosophical speculation; it rather constitutes the basis of very real differences in 
the empirical structure of domination. The reason for this fact lies in the generally observable 
need of any power, or even of any advantage of life, to justify itself. 
 
Weber himself actually saw self-legitimation (the justification of the legitimacy of a form of 
domination) as constituting the basis of the type of empirical structure of domination. 
Barker’s  emphasis on this aspect is therefore very useful in the investigation of the 
legitimacy of an order. Rulers justify themselves to themselves through a variety of rituals, 
rhetoric, and dramatisations in order to cultivate an identity distinguished from that of 
ordinary men and women. Furthermore, rulers need to legitimate themselves not only in their 
own eyes, but also in the eyes of their immediate staff, what Weber calls the chief’s 
“administrative staff”. Weber further contrasts the staff with ‘subjects’, as does Barker 
(2001:59). Likewise, the members of the staff not only need to legitimate themselves 
collectively to themselves, but in the eyes of the ordinary subjects as well. As follows, 
ordinary subjects also legitimate themselves to themselves. 
 Along these lines, the ruler and his staff attempt at convincing themselves of the 
rights of their position. As it is characteristic of governments to claim legitimacy, an 
unlegitimated state is a contradiction in terms; it is all a matter of degree and not whether a 
state is legitimated or not (Barker, 2001: 20-1). A useful question, on the other hand, is to ask 
in what way, and with what success, a government or another type of ruler claims legitimacy 
(Barker, 2001: 16). Barker stresses the first question the most; and here he is more elaborate 
than Weber. As legitimation is an observable human activity, Barker (2001: 23) maintains 
that the study of it would broaden the scope of enquiry into the activities of rulers. It could 
possibly also raise a more richly dimensional account of these activities and of the character 
and consequences of self-legitimation.  
 In fact, the conviction of one’s right to a position can be all the more intense in the 
identity of rebels, who lack palaces or government offices, having perhaps only a belief in 
their authority. Self-legitimation is a defining aspect of their political activity, and they, just 
as governments, define themselves as set apart from those they seek to govern. A select group 
is identified that is uniquely qualified to appropriate the state. The members of this group are 
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marked off by piety, courage, insight or dedication. They will be characterised in a way that 
stresses their exceptional nature (Barker, 2001: 89-94).  
 The self-legitimation of rebels is likely to mirror the self-legitimation of the 
demonised opposing party, and also to draw claims from the values and governing 
legitimations of their own society. Communists may for instance use the values of democracy, 
nationalism and patriotism, but challenge those of capitalism. In democratic states, 
legitimation will most likely refer to popular sovereignty, but the democratic argument may 
vary according to the function or consequences of the argument for the rebels’ own sense of 
authority (Barker, 2001: 89-91).  
 In order to justify its violent actions, a rebel group needs to demonise those it is 
opposing; to depict an enemy which is dangerous to the community in question, and by 
giving an image of itself as the protector of that community. Accordingly, their discourse and 
actions serve to confirm their authority to rule (Barker, 2001: 91-4). The language of 
rebellion is hence filled with accounts of heroes and heroism, and the rebel leaders aspire to 
heroic status, being passionate in their internal legitimation. The semi-secrecy with which 
rebels operate is tactical, and is a means of cultivating loyalty, identity and solidarity. 
Symbolism, ritual nomenclature, signs, passwords, oaths, and rebel songs performed in secret 
all contribute to the internal cohesion of the rebel group. In order to achieve the latter, rebels 
need to believe in themselves (Barker, 2001: 98-9).  
 Political authority thus requires a cultural frame in order to define itself (Barker, 2001: 
98); it needs to create a distinctive identity. David Snow and associates (1986: 464) by using 
the concept of ‘frame alignment’ refer to “the linkage of individual and social movement 
interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and 
social movement activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary”. Symbols 
that can mediate among the cultural underpinnings of those they appeal to, and still reflect the 
group’s own beliefs and aspirations, are most likely to be chosen (Tarrow, 1994: 122). Put 
differently, rebels have to fit themselves into their social setting and adapt to the receptivity 
of their host societies (Clapham, 1998: 12). Again, the construction of demonising narratives 
about the enemy is also a vital activity for rebels to believe in what they do, because the 
legitimation of the existing rulers denies their own legitimating discourse (Barker, 2001: 97-
99).  
 Concluding from the above, it can be very difficult for rebels to surrender, given that 
it would involve a contradiction between their self-description and perception, and a re-
description would become necessary. To create a whole new description of one’s group and 
hence of every single member’s own identity, can be even more difficult to swallow than a 
tactical or other type of failure (Barker, 2001: 105).   
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 Barker’s complement to the understanding of legitimacy for my thesis is very 
interesting because he treats not only how rulers of states, but how rebels justify themselves 
and take part in the active creation of a distinctive identity and internal legitimacy. His theory 
is therefore of instrumental use, as it contains indicators of how this is done. The FARC 
controls large areas of the Colombian territory; yet these are not always fixed, but changing. 
It is therefore difficult to know who the ‘the subjects’ are, and whether they see their order as 
legitimate. It is however feasible to look at how the leaders of the group (‘the rulers’) justify 
their own actions and how they create a ‘Farian’ collective identity, not forgetting that they 
have to take “some set of individual interests, values and beliefs” of their subjects into 
account and also relate to their cultural underpinnings. The way they choose to do this of 
course has consequences for ‘ordinary subjects’. I now turn to Weber’s theory of legitimacy.  
 
Legitimacy in a Social System:  
Max Weber and the Concept of Legitimate Order  
 
According to Weber (1968: 31), legitimacy is a necessary element for the existence of a 
sufficiently stable social order. The probability that social action will be governed by the 
belief in the existence of a legitimate order is referred to as the “validity” of that order. The 
content of a social relationship will hence be called an order when action is oriented toward 
determinable “maxims”, and when this orientation occurs because it is regarded by the actor 
as obligatory or exemplary. The probability that action will orient itself this way will further 
increase when the order is held to define a model or to be binding; then it enjoys ‘legitimacy’. 
It is the subjective belief in the validity of an order that constitutes the valid order itself, as 
opposed to a legal treatment of it (Weber, 1968: 31-33). Within an order there may exist 
different interpretations of the meaning of the order, but even these contradictory systems 
may be recognised as valid as long as each interpretation determines the course of action. 
According to Weber (1968: 33) there is an undeniable relationship between the probability of 
orientation to the belief in the validity of an order and the relevant course of economic action. 




Domination14 and Legitimacy: The Three Pure Types of Authority15 
 
There are according to Weber three types of legitimate domination, related to the basis of the 
claims to legitimacy made by the person in authority: 
(1) Legal authority, based on rational grounds- that is, on a belief in the legality of 
performed rules and the right of the person in authority to issue commands. 
 (2) Traditional authority, based on traditional grounds- that is, on a belief in the 
sanctity of traditions and the right of the person in authority to issue commands.  
(3) Charismatic authority, based on charismatic grounds- that is, resting on an 
individual person’s exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character, and of his right to 
ordain normative patterns of order (Weber, 1968: 215-16).     
 The rule over a considerable amount of people normally requires an administrative 
staff, whose members may be bound to obedience to their superior(s) for a number of motives. 
The type of domination is largely determined by the quality of these motives. The belief in 
legitimacy, a necessity for an order to be sufficiently stable, is also necessary for a 
sufficiently reliable basis of domination to be established. The kind of legitimacy that is 
claimed is especially important to classify, because the type of obedience16, administrative 
staff and mode of exercising authority will all depend on it (Weber, 1968: 212-13). 
 I will now briefly go through the forms of administration that correspond to each type 
of domination. According to Swedberg (1998: 58), it is however rarely noted that there is also 
an important economic dimension to Weber’s analysis of domination, a fact that is of 
particular interest because of my analysis of the FARC’s war economy. The different 
administrative types are paid for in different ways, and the ways in which they are staffed 
also affect the economy. I will therefore also note the economic aspects of these of each 
administrative type. Inherent in legal authority is that there is a line between the incumbent in 
a position and the position itself. The officials are also separated from “the means of 
production or administration”, as Weber (1968: 219) describes it. The “superior”, for instance 
the elected president of a state, is also subject to an impersonal order in that he, in his 
commands and dispositions, orients his actions to the order. According to Weber (1968: 223-
25), the purest form of administration in the legal type of domination is the bureaucracy, in 
that it fundamentally means domination through knowledge and a sense of duty as to what 
concerns the officials. It is the most efficient and the most rational known means of 
                                                 
 14 ‘Domination’ according to Weber (1968: 53) is the “probability that a command with a given 
specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons”. 
15 Weber’s typology of legitimate domination can alternatively be translated as authority. ‘Authority’ 
is hence not a specification of the basis of compliance (Weber, 1968: 299).  
16 ‘Obedience’ is defined by Weber (1968: 215) as action that follows a course taking the content of 
the command as the basis of action for its own sake, this without regard to the actor’s own attitude to 
the value of the command.  
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exercising authority over human beings. Officials receive a fixed salary, the amount of which 
depends on the rank of their office, and there is also usually a pension. The bureaucracy is 
typically paid for through taxation, presupposing a money economy. A state bureaucracy is 
indispensable for rational capitalism to work (Weber, 1968: 975).  
 The basis of rule in traditional authority primarily derives from the sanctity of old 
rules and powers. From the basis of the masters’ traditional status they are obeyed, as they are 
also designated according to traditional rules. In the simplest case this type of organised rule 
is based on personal loyalty, and the staff consequently does not consist of officials but of 
personal retainers. Personal loyalty then, also determines the relationship between the 
administrative staff and the “personal master” (Weber, 1968: 226-7). The most important 
form of traditional authority is patrimonialism, defined by Weber as a regime in which all 
political and economic rights are regarded by the ruler as his personal rights. He constantly 
tries to enlarge his own personal fortune, with very irrational results: “The ruler’s favour and 
disfavour, grants and confiscations, continuously create new wealth and destroy it again” 
(Weber, 1968: 1099). Patrimonial offices are paid for by the ruler himself- the larger his 
personal fortune, the larger his administration. The general effect on the economy is a 
discouragement of rational capitalism and an encouragement of traditional economic 
behaviour as well as certain kinds of political capitalism17 (Weber, 1968: 1095). 
 Examples of charismatic authority include prophets, warrior heroes and great 
demagogues, described as having superhuman qualities. The “charismatic administrative 
staff” will be made up of followers of the charismatic leader, who are not technically trained, 
but are chosen in terms of their charismatic qualities. The validity of charisma depends on 
recognition on the part of those subject to authority. In genuine charisma the basis of 
legitimacy lies in the subjects’ conception of duty to recognise this genuineness and to act 
accordingly. The members must therefore recognise the new obligations that the leader might 
preach, create or demand (Weber, 1968: 241-244). 
 At first, the charismatic community shares everything according to need, and the staff 
finances itself through voluntary gift. No administrative organ exists, no formal rules, no 
hierarchy; rather agents who have been provided with authority by their chief. The 
charismatic type of domination however goes through a routinisation, and charisma becomes 
less pure. The financing of the administration also goes through changes as the staff members 
try to introduce stable salaries. The charismatic organisation hence transforms into some kind 
of patrimonial or feudal organisation (Weber, 1968: 243-50). The impact of charismatic 
                                                 
17 ‘Political capitalism’ in Weber’s writings is a type of capitalism in which profit-making is made 
possible via the state, for example through contracts with the state. Orientations of profit-making can 
involve such things as opportunities for predatory profit and opportunities for “unusual transactions” 
between the state and state agencies. In modern capitalism the defence industry is often an example of 
political capitalism (Swedberg, 2005: 199-200).  
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authority on the economy obviously differs at different stages. This type of domination is 
initially hostile to all forms of systematic activity. When it has gone through the phase of 
routinisation, it is usually a conservative force (Weber, 1968: 1118). 
 The basis of legitimacy by virtue of tradition is the oldest and most universal one, 
whereas the most common form today is the belief in legality, that is, enactments that are 
formally correct and established in a familiar manner- as when using the ballot. The 
willingness to submit to an order led by only one person or a small group always depends on 
whether the one(s) imposing it is believed to enjoy legitimate authority (Weber, 1968: 37).  
Moreover, there is normally a variety of interests and ascriptions of legitimacy that 
determines submission to an order. There may for example be a mixture of adherence to 
tradition and belief in legality, and the actors belonging to the order themselves are often not 
aware of the degree to which their adherence rests upon convention or law18 (Weber, 1968: 
36-37). 
 
Discussion: The Weberian Understanding of Legitimacy 
 
Max Weber’s conception of legitimacy is the most dominant model for empirical 
investigations of legitimacy. It however differs from the conventional meaning of the concept, 
which involves a normative evaluation of a political regime- how its decisions are justified, 
the correctness of its procedures, and whether it treats its subjects fairly (Grafstein, 1981: 
457).  
Legitimacy to Weber is namely about individuals’ belief that their order is legitimate, 
a fact that has been criticised by, among others, Robert Grafstein. “In the end”, he says (1981: 
456), “Weber virtually identifies legitimacy with stable and effective political power, 
reducing it to a routine submission to authority”. Grafstein further objects that for Weber, 
legitimacy is simply a matter of fact, the fact that citizens hold a certain belief. The essence of 
Weber’s concept of legitimacy is hence the individuals’ sense of duty, obligation, or what 
ought to be done according to rules, principles or commands issued by the authority (Spencer, 
1970: 126). According to Weber himself (1968: 33), as we have seen, there is in the ordinary 
sense of the word ‘causal’, a causal relationship between the probability of orientation to the 
subjective belief in the validity of an order and the relevant course of economic action, as 
outlined above.  
                                                 
18 ‘Convention’ is an order whose validity is externally guaranteed in that deviation from it will 
provoke a general and significant reaction of disapproval. ‘Law’ is an order whose validity is 
externally guaranteed in that a staff will bring about compliance or avenge violation in order to apply 
physical or psychological coercion (Weber, 1968: 34). 
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The “simple matter of fact” that members of an order (i.e. conflict actors) hold 
certain beliefs can therefore have enormous implications when it comes to conflict behaviour. 
As Weber implies, beliefs in the validity of an order are namely reflected in the course of 
action. One must therefore look at the course of action of the order as a whole in order to 
understand what kind of legitimacy it holds. It is “useful to classify the types of domination 
according to the kind of claim to legitimacy typically made by each”, because the type of 
obedience, administrative staff and mode of exercising authority will differ according to the 
latter (Weber, 1968: 213). However, it can be argued that the relationship between the kind of 
legitimacy that is claimed and the respective course of action is reciprocal and organic more 
than in any simple sense causal (Barker, 2001: 38). What is important is that a relationship 
indeed exists.  
 For my empirical inquiries, Weber’s identification of legitimacy is consequently very 
useful because I am asking whether the FARC enjoys a high degree of internal legitimacy and 
cohesion (do its members submit routinely to authority, and if so, on what bases?). My 
assumption is that the FARC’s members do submit routinely to authority, and that the FARC 
enjoys internal legitimacy. The question therefore becomes: what kind of legitimacy is 
claimed? I certainly do not intend to give a normative evaluation of the FARC’s political 
regime; neither of whether its subjects are treated fairly nor of the correctness of its 
procedures.  
 
Outline of Thesis 
 
In keeping with the theoretical perspectives and parameters sketched out, my work will be 
organised as follows: 
 Chapter 2 will provide an historical perspective, as this is necessary in order to 
understand the historical context of the conflict, the functions of violence (Berdal and Keen, 
1997: 798-99) at the time of the origins of the FARC, as well its self-legitimating narratives. 
Chapter 3 will address the organisational resources that according to Clapham are 
crucial to the effectiveness of a guerrilla group. This will be done with the help of all of his 
indicators of effectiveness, except the two last ones concerning relationship to host societies. 
These will rather be dealt with in the next chapter, as they concern social aspects related to 
the FARC’s war economy19.  
Chapter 4 will provide a study of the FARC’s war economy as a form of social 
interaction. The question of whether the case of the FARC fits Collier and Hoeffler’s findings 
                                                 
19 It is interesting to note however, that none of Clapham’s indicators is directly related to economic 
resources. 
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will be briefly discussed, and I will look at the social aspects that the economic approach to 
conflict does not account for. These social aspects include the symbiotic economic 
relationship that exists in the FARC’s strongholds, and the failure of the state to recognise the 
coca farmers’ right to citizenship.  
Chapter 5 will first provide an examination of the FARC leadership’s legitimating 
activities, employing Barker’s account of archetypal rebel legitimation. This will also involve 
their setting themselves apart as distinct from “ordinary subjects” as well as a brief 
investigation into the counter-legitimations of the ruling part (the state). The group’s identity 
as constructed by its leadership and hence symbolic aspects of the system will be covered 
here, and I will address how some of the contradictions between the FARC’s narratives and 
their tactics and practice are justified and legitimated. This will explain whether non-political 
functions of violence such as its war economic system is a problem for internal cohesion.  
This chapter will also establish the type of authority and corresponding type of 
administration reigning within the FARC according to Weber’s typology of domination, thus 
categorising the basis of legitimacy of the FARC. This will be done by drawing on 
Clapham’s indicators addressing the group’s level of discipline and coherence, as well as 
effective structures. These will be employed in order to uncover whether and to what degree 
there is a “sense of duty, obligation, or what ought to be done according to rules, principles or 
commands”, noted above as the essence of Weber’s concept of legitimacy. The latter will 
give indications on the type of administrative staff of the FARC. Thereafter, Weber’s and 















CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The modern history of Colombia’s internal conflict involves the liquidation of any political 
movement seen as a threat to the elites; it engrosses armed conflict and war, the 
consolidation of violent conflict actors, an increase in drug production, the establishment of 
drug cartels and governmental attempts at extinguishing these. It also revolves around U.S. 
interference, drug money involved in corruption within politics and institutions, and a sad 
failure to achieve peace. After all, however, attempts have been made at weakening the 
traditional influence of the militaries and democratising the regime; and today there seems to 
be a tendency moving towards a multiparty system within Colombian politics.    
 
The Internal Conflict in Colombia 1946-2006 
 
According to Sánchez (2004: 20), the liquidation of the Gaitanista Movement within 
Colombian collective memory is the inaugural moment of Colombia’s modern history. The 
gaitanismo was the political project of Jorge Eliciér Gaitán, whose death in 1948 intensified 
the violence between liberals and conservatives. 
 In order to say something about the Colombian conflict, we must therefore at least 
superficially go back to the circumstances that resulted in the complex phenomenon of The 
Violence, which took place between 1946 and 196020 (Pécaut, 2004: 77). While the non-
resolution of The Violence has meant ending up in the diversity of violence of the last 
decades, today’s armed confrontation is not the result of an inevitable culmination of its 
historical antecedents (Sánchez ,2004: 20; 42).  
 Jorge Eliciér Gaitán was a Liberal politician who gained national acknowledgment 
as a political figure when he in 1929 reported the massacre committed in 1928 against the 
banana workers of the United Fruit Company, of which he denounced responsible the 
government and the Army (Marín, 2004). In 1933 he founded the Leftist Revolutionary 
Union (La Unión Izquierdista Revolucionaria- UNIR), disappointed as he was in the Liberal 
Government. He thereby attempted to create an alternative to the traditional bipartisan 
system21, and gained the sympathy and support of peasants and members of the working 
class in his struggle for better working conditions and a more just distribution of land 
(Sánchez, 1982: 192). His political project was however too difficult to put into effect 
                                                 
20 The duration of The Violence varies according to different theorists and databases. The University 
of Uppsala refers to the Violence as a patrician civil war going on between 1946 and 1958, whereas 
others denote it to the period of 1946-66 (Bergquist, Peñaranda and Sánchez, 1992). For the 
University of Uppsala’s Conflict Data Program, see http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/index.htm.  
21 Since their consolidation in the 1850s, the political system in Colombia has been dominated by two 
parties; the Liberal and the Conservative (Tuft, 2001: 141).  
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outside the bipartisan system, and in 1935 he left UNIR behind and returned to the Liberal 
Party. From within the Liberal Party he created what has been denominated the Gaitanista 
Movement, and in 1944, he started campaigning for the presidential elections (Marín, 2004). 
The Gaitanista Movement was not depicted as a proletarian movement, but as a “people’s 
movement”22 (movimiento del pueblo) which sought to undermine the stability of the secular 
bipartisan system, stimulating the rebelliousness of the masses against the conservative and 
the liberal oligarchies (Sánchez, 1982: 193-5).  
The appeal of the two traditional political parties in Colombia had however been 
reinforced at the beginning of the 20th century. At that time, the most important Colombian 
industry, the coffee production, consisted mostly of smallholders who suffered violent 
competition between themselves. They depended on allegiance to one of the traditional 
parties, because that meant allies and favours if their party gained control. This clientelismo 
(patronage) eliminated any social threat to the ruling class (Bergquist, 1992: 65-67). After 
1938, there had been a clear movement to the right in Colombian politics, involving a halt of 
reform, as well as the reversal of land and labour laws that were passed in the mid 1930s. In 
1945 a repressive approach towards organised labour was put into effect (Bergquist, 1992: 
68-9). The beginning of reaction began, of which the gaitanismo played a central part. 
Gaitán did not win the presidential elections of 1946; the official liberal candidate was 
Gabriel Turbay, who lost to the conservative candidate Mariano Ospina Pérez. Gaitán 
however got a significant amount of votes, especially in the most important urban centres of 
the country (Marín, 2004).  
On 7 February 1948, Gaitán organised the “Silent Protest” (“la Manifestación del 
Silencio”) against the political violence that had taken place throughout the country in the 
past two years. There was already a de facto civil war between the Liberal and Conservative 
parties, marking off the beginning of The Violence. The protest brought more than a hundred 
thousand people to the main square Plaza de Bolívar in Bogotá, proving how strong the 
Gaitanista Movement had become. This frightened the traditional sectors of the bipartisan 
system. On 9 April the same year, at 1:05 in the afternoon, Gaitán was killed as he was 
leaving his office (Marín, 2004). His death brought with it a popular insurrection, one that 
will be addressed further as I proceed to the history of the FARC.  
  In order to find a solution to The Violence, the civilian elites called on the military, 
and in 1953, General Rojas Pinilla took over state power. The Liberals and Conservatives 
however formed a bipartisan coalition in 1958 in order to regain power; a 16-year power 
sharing agreement that would exclude other political entities (Tuft, 2001: 144) and disallow 
                                                 
22 The ”people” for Gaitán consisted of an anti-oligarchic and anti-monopolist block of classes 
composed by the lower middle class, peasants without land or about to lose it, and the working class 
(Sánchez, 1982: 193).  
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any new arenas for opposition (Leal, 2004: 87). This agreement was called The National 
Front, and was to last until 1974. It permitted the military to handle public order with a great 
deal of autonomy, and their political guidelines were so unclear that the military high 
command could add to them its own particular dispositions. These consisted of anti-
communism and a political-military conception marked by the Latin American doctrine of 
national security (Leal, 2004: 87).  
Various guerrilla groups were formed during the National Front; among these the 
FARC, the ELN (Ejército Nacional de Liberación), the EPL (Ejército Popular de Liberación) 
and the M-19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril). Those trying to raise opposition by peaceful means 
were also seen as enemies by the system. An indiscriminate use of the exceptional 
constitutional measure of a ‘state of siege’23 was employed in order to deal with public 
disorder, and a path was opened for the proliferation of paramilitary organisations: civil 
defence organisations were permitted to bear arms for private use. The guerrilla problem was 
not dealt with other than by armed force (Leal, 2004: 87-9).  
 During the presidential period of President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala (1978-82), the 
autonomy of military institutions was further extended. He promulgated the National 
Security Statute, imposing a state of siege and expanding repression to the cities. The M-1924 
at the beginning of 1980 overtook the Embassy of the Dominican Republic, and held 16 
diplomats hostage for two months. A military operation led to the capture of the M-19’s 
leadership who were put on trial at the end of Turbay’government (Leal, 2004: 89-90).    
 At this stage, the drug economy was about to be activated. The FARC is the guerrilla 
group which learned to take benefit from this development the most, as it already controlled 
the peripheral areas where the coca cultivations were developed. Many paramilitary groups, 
on the other hand, were now formed by drug traffickers such as Gonzalo Rodrígez Gacha, 
one of the men close to Pablo Escobar. The conflict consequently grew in intensity, and 
between 1980-88 it was an intermediate armed conflict, possibly war in several of the years 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002: 635).  
 President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) is remembered for the peace process with 
the guerrillas, in which he recognised the political character of these by means of an amnesty 
law (Leal, 2004:90). This in 1984 led to a ceasefire, and subsequently to the formation of the 
Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica-UP). The UP was a legal political party affiliated with the 
FARC, supported by the Colombian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Colombiano- 
PCC) and other leftist groups. The party got a considerable amount of votes in the following 
elections (Molano, 2000: 27). The UP was however exterminated at the end of the 1980s. 
                                                 
23 Its consequence being a de facto abolition of the rule of law (Leal, 2004: 88). 
24 Whereas the other rebel organisations mainly operated in rural areas, the M-19 operated in the cities, 
attacking the constituted regimes directly (Pécaut, 2004: 79). 
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Most of the UP activists were murdered during President Virgilio Barco’s administration 
(1986-1990) by paramilitaries financed by Pablo Escobar and tolerated by the Army, a 
phenomenon that has been called the Dirty War (la Guerra Sucia). In 1987 the ceasefire was 
brought to an end after a FARC attack against the Army. The same year, an alliance named 
the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Movement Coordinating Body (Coordinadora Guerrillera 
Simón Bolívar-CGSB) was formed between the FARC, the M-19, the EPL and the ELN. 
(Leal, 2004: 91, 104).  
 In the overlapping of the presidential periods of Virgilio Barco and Cesar Gaviria 
(1990-1994), talks with M-19 were more successful. These ended up in the demobilisation of 
the guerrilla group and the creation of the Democratic Alliance of the M-19, a party that has 
gained some importance in Colombian politics. Gaviria also created the position of a 
presidential secretary for defence and security and appointed the first civilian Minister of 
Defence (Leal, 2004: 92). The new Constitution promulgated in 1991 was viewed as an 
effort to build up a minimum of state coherence and efficacy and also to democratise the 
regime. A decentralisation of resources from the centre to the regions and a strengthening of 
power of Congress and Courts however also meant an increase in the state’s barriers in 
asserting its power and centrality (Bejarano and Pizarro, 2001: 7).   
 In 1993, Pablo Escobar was killed in Medellín by the Search Bloc, which consisted 
of military and police personell. It was the most publicised armed operation of Colombia’s 
modern history so far. Interference by drug traffickers in national politics however did not 
end there, as it was discovered that the Cali cartel contributed to the presidential campaign of 
Ernesto Samper with more than five million dollars. The aim of this support was to prevent 
extradition and to somehow have its activities tolerated. The illicit drug trade hence became 
the most important factor in national security during Samper’s government (1994-1998), 
eager as he was to respond to U.S. pressure and regain confidence (Leal, 2004: 94-98). The 
sale of cement and gasoline, used in the production of coca paste, was increasingly 
controlled, and fumigations of coca plantations in the Amazon region were amplified 
(Ramírez, 2005:58). This policy however did not work well, as the areas devoted to illicit 
crops continued to increase. Less attention was given to the guerrillas and the paramilitaries, 
who grew considerably (Leal, 2004: 97-98).  
 President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) was elected at a time when a negotiated 
solution of the conflict seemed especially urgent. Pastrana and his government initiated a 
new peace effort, but perhaps they were too eager to secure peace quickly (Leal, 2004: 99). 
Pastrana agreed to the military’s withdrawal from five municipalities in the south of 
Colombia, the so-called demilitarised zone, where the peace talks would take place. The 
talks broke down in February 2002, after which the FARC has been sharpening its military 
confrontations (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 118). Since the start of the presidency of Álvaro 
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Uribe (2002), the organisation has been threatening and terrorising municipal authorities in 
order to jeopardise the governance of the country (Leal, 2004: 102).   
 Plan Colombia was put into effect during the presidencies of Pastrana in Colombia 
and Bill Clinton in the U.S.A., providing Colombia with 860 million dollars, mostly for 
military assistance. The plan was thereafter regionalised during the presidency of George W. 
Bush, as it was to cover also Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela and Panama (Leal, 
2004: 101), and was now to be called the “Andean Initiative”. Earlier the same year, the plan 
had been opposed by the European Parliament.25 It has been subject to criticism as to the 
actual motivations for such a plan as well as to the methods used in the ‘war against drugs’ 
and the ‘war against terrorism’. One serious problem has been futile fumigation of coca 
fields, involving a lack of differentiation between small scale coca growers, ‘terrorists’, and 
drug traffickers26.  
 The failure of the peace talks headed by President Andrés Pastrana led a huge part of 
the Colombian public to discredit a political solution to the conflict. This was one of the 
reasons why Álvaro Uribe was elected in 2002, as subversion had only grown stronger. The 
paramilitaries had also expanded, and the Colombian public had become increasingly aware 
of the precarious security situation. Now, the Colombian internal conflict had developed into 
a civil war27, which was to continue. Uribe’s ‘Democratic Security’ based on a hard-line 
approach became popular (Leal, 2004: 101-3). In 2004 Uribe put into effect a plan called 
The Patriotic Plan (el Plan Patriota), a military campaign without precedents aimed at 
fighting the FARC in its areas of influence. 18 000 men have penetrated the jungles of the 
departments of Caquetá, Meta and Guaviare, searching for the Secretariat of the FARC. The 
campaign has not succeeded in the latter, but has been able to recuperate control in the urban 
centres of Cartagena del Chairá, Miraflores, La Macarena, Calamar and El Retorno. 
However, according to sociologist Gilberto Sánchez at the National University in Bogotá, 
this has not included a social program.28 The concentration of troops in the zone of the 
Patriotic Plan has also been favouring strategies of the FARC of attacking the police in 
peripheral regions to alleviate the military pressure from the area of the Patriotic Plan29 and 
                                                 
25 Giordano, Al:  “Colombia: Bush to regionalise ‘drug war’”, Green Left Weekly, Online Edition, 
http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2001/441/441p23b.htm, accessed 9 June, 2006 
26 For informative accounts on these matters, see f. ex. María Clemencia Ramírez, Winifred Tate 
(2000) and Nazih Richani (2003: 27-28).  
27 According to the Uppsala database, the intensity of the Colombian internal armed conflict between 
1989-2000 as well as in 2003 was intermediate. In the years 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2005 there was 
however a civil war. The number of battle-related deaths in 2005 was 1356, of which 1178 were 
attributed to battles between the FARC and government led operations.   
28 ”El Patriota: de la contienda militar al desafío social”, El Tiempo, Bogotá, 6 May, 2006, 
http://www.eltiempo.com.  
29 Especiales Online: “Ataques de las FARC”, http://www.semana.com. 
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to create new corridors and areas of consolidation30 (see appendix nr. 2 for major FARC 
attacks in 2005).  
 Another project of today’s President of Colombia is the so-called “Justice and Peace 
Law” (Ley de Justicia y Paz), a demobilisation program for the paramilitaries. The law has 
been harshly criticised by INGOs such as Amnesty International 31  and Human Rights 
Watch32, claiming that in reality, it is an impunity law that affects victims’ rights and may 
place judges in difficult and dangerous situations. The law has been modified since it was 
passed in Colombian Congress in 2005, but is nevertheless still subject to criticism. 
According to the Bogotan newspaper El Tiempo (19 April 2006), 30 431 paramilitaries have 
demobilised, the highest number of demobilised irregular combatants so far in Colombian 
history. In accordance with the same newspaper article, referring to a report supported by the 
Swedish Embassy, crime in Colombia in the zones of disarmament has gone down by 48 %. 
It only remains to see whether this is a stable number.  
 Uribe moreover worked for a change in the Constitution that would make his re-
election possible, and was indeed re-elected in 2006. A new configuration of political parties 
has also taken place during the past few years as a result of new electoral rules. The parties 
are now concentrated around Uribe and the parties supporting him, and around the 
opposition. On the uribista33 side we find Partido de la U (“the U-Party”), Cambio Radical 
(“Radical Change”), the traditional Conservative Party, Equipo Alas Colombia (“Team 
Wings Colombia”), Colombia Democrática (“Democratic Colombia”), and Convergencia 
Ciudadana (“Citizens’ Convergence”); on the side of the opposition, Polo Democrático 
(Democratic Pole”) and the traditional Liberal Party. The parties joining Uribe, the 
Conservative Party aside, can be characterised as flexible, interim political groups created 
for electoral purposes which have no clearly defined ideology. There are strong tensions and 
divisions between their leaders, who in some cases have joined one another only for 
transitory convenience (Arciniegas and Hernández, 2006). As to the left-centre, the leader of 
the Democratic Pole Carlos Gaviria received 22% of the presidential votes, which has led to 
some optimism regarding the creation of a real left wing outside the traditional two party 
system. 
 As to negotiations to take place between Uribe’s government and the FARC, there is 
little hope after the explosion of a car bomb in a military school on 19 October 2006, 
attributed to the the FARC by the military authorities (Bolívar, 2006).   
                                                 
30 ”Análisis noticioso: Por qué los ataques a Toribío”, El Tiempo, Bogotá, 19 April 2005. 
31 ”Colombia: El Presidente Uribe no debe ratificar la ley de impunidad”, Press comuniqué 13 July 
2005, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ESLAMR230212005, accessed 8 May 2006. 
32 “Letter to President Alvaro Uribe”, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/09/06/colomb14132.htm, 
accessed 2 October 2006. 
33 Uribe and his supporters are called uribistas. 
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The Origins of the FARC 
  
 The communist guerrillas emerged as far back as 194934, as peasant resistance against the 
official violence of the time. Self defence and organisation related to agrarian conflicts are 
old traditions in Colombia, involving the utilisation of both legal and illegal means. Both 
liberal and communist armed cores were formed in the south of the department of Tolima, 
and in 1950 a joint guerrilla conference was celebrated. The conference gave the groups 
under its direction the name of ‘Revolutionary Army of National Liberation’ (Ejército 
Revolucionario de Liberación Nacional)(Pizarro, 1989: 3-5; 10).  
 The origins of the armed movement of the FARC can likewise be found in the south 
of Tolima, in the municipality of Chaparral. (see appendix nr. 3). Here, agrarian conflicts 
were continuous when The Violence was initiated. The following communist self defence 
cores emerged in Chaparral from 1949 on: Chicalá, Horizontes, La Marina, and Irco. A self 
defence movement led by Isauro Yosa, or Mayor Lister35, was later turned into the first solid, 
mobile guerrilla group of communist influence (Pizarro, 1989: 5-10). Yosa, himself from 
Irco, Chaparral, and a group of peasants being displaced from their farms as a consequence 
of official violence, left these behind and arrived in what was to be called El Davis, in the 
municipality of Rioblanco. This was a guerrilla command, a concentration of communist 
guerrilla fighters (Matta36, 1999: 57-61).  
 Manuel Marulanda Vélez37, today’s Commander in Chief of the FARC, and Jacobo 
Prias Alape, or Charro Negro; were liberal commanders at the time. They however joined in 
a march towards El Davis in which hundreds of families participated, running away from the 
army’s attacks. Jaime Guaraca, who was later to become the second in command of the 
FARC, also participated in this march, still as a liberal. After arriving in El Davis, Manuel 
Marulanda Vélez and Jacobo Prias Alape decided to enter into the communist movement 
(Matta, 1999: 62-65).  
 The years 1949-1953 of the communist armed movement were to be characterised 
both by self defence and mobile guerrillas. The unity between communists and liberals was 
                                                 
34  It is important here to note that the contemporary guerrilla group of the FARC inherits very 
different dynamics and contain actors with different characteristics and life situations from those that 
gave the FARC its origins. The conditions given are of course not the same today as they were in 
1949.  
35 This name was given him in order to honour the proletarian general Enrique Lister of the Spanish 
civil war (Matta, 1999: 57).  
36 All the information given by Matta comes from Jaime Guaraca´s testimony (see this page, further 
below). Guaraca´s testimony must of course be treated with care, but large parts of his account 
concerning the first guerrilla cores can be confirmed by others, such as Pizarro (1989). 
37  His real name is Pedro Antonio Marín. He took on the name of Marulanda as a tribute to a 
communist leader who was assassinated in 1951 (“Los alias, algo más que una simple ‘chapa’”, in El 
País, Cali, 9 Dec., 2005. http://www.elpais.com.co). 
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not to last long. The contradictions between the “limpios” and the “comunes”38 were to end 
up in an internal fight lasting for 22 months, with effects of wear and tear for both groups 
(Pizarro, 1989: 7; 11; Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 26). 
 One of the principal objectives of the government of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 
in 1953 was the demobilisation of the armed groups, offering a general and unconditional 
amnesty. Most of the communist guerrillas agreed to converting into self defence groups, but 
without demobilising and without handing in their arms (Pizarro, 1989: 13). According to 
Jaime Guaraca (Matta, 1998:79), only 30 men led by Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Prias 
Alape continued as an active guerrilla group even in this period of self defence which was to 
last until 1954. That year, the Colombian Intelligence Service used assassinators newly 
released from prison to kill self defence groups and peasants in the south of Tolima. The 
bipartisan violence and insurgency consequently regained their past years’ dynamics, and 
many Colombians came to see the amnesty as a ploy of the government (Sánchez, 1992: 
102-9). Now, the Army was to bomb agrarian communist self defence areas of Villarica in 
the east of Tolima systematically from the air, employing also Napalm bombs. As a direct or 
indirect consequence of the military aggression, a hundred thousand people or more 
emigrated from the east of Tolima and the southwest of Cundinamarca. Organised and armed 
colonisers moved towards the rivers of Pato, Caguán, Ariari and Guayabero and towards the 
village of La Uribe in the department of Meta, where they created autonomous local 
authorities substituting the lacking state apparatus of the area (Pizarro, 1989: 19-20).   
 The strategies of resistance were redefined with the National Front in 1958. The 
PCC, having been illegalised during Rojas’ government, with the collapse of the latter 
declared itself legal and decided to support the presidential candidature of Liberal Alberto 
Lleras Camargo. The party thereby decided to work through legal channels which also 
involved the armed movement under its influence. Jacobo Prias Alape (Charro Negro) 
negotiated with the government on behalf of the communist guerrillas, which resulted in a 
peace agreement, but again without handing in their arms (Pizarro, 1989: 23-24). The 
guerrillas decided that from now on, they would be calling themselves an ‘agrarian 
movement’ and that a special commission would distribute land in the making of their own 
agrarian reform (Matta, 1999: 105). 
 A new period of self defence was initiated, and for more than two years, the agrarian 
communist movement was able to maintain a relatively stable situation in their areas of 
influence: Marquetalia, El Pato, Sumapaz, and Rio Chiquito. These were places of refuge for 
those who fled The Violence and the expropriation of their land. Manuel Marulanda Vélez 
                                                 
38 The liberals of no communist influence were popularly called ”limpios”, meaning “clean”, whereas 
the communists were called “comunes” or “liberales sucios”, meaning “dirty liberals” (Pizarro, 1989: 
11). 
 33 
was even appointed an official position that he occupied for almost two years (Pizarro, 1989: 
25).  
 Things then started to turn complicated, as there was growing pressure against the 
agrarian movement of Marquetalia. According to Jaime Guaraca, Alberto Lleras Camargo’s 
government started to make agreements with former liberal guerrillas in order to go against 
the revolutionary, agrarian movement and against Marquetalia. A plan designated to kill 
Jacobo Prias Alape succeeded on 11 January 1960 in the streets of Gaitania (Matta, 1999: 
108-115). Pizarro (1989: 29) confirms that the guerrilleros limpios who killed him, led by 
Jesús María Oviedo (“Mariachi”), were permitted to do so both by civil and military 
authorities. 
 From 1961 onwards, Álvaro Gómez Hurtado presented fire-raising speeches in the 
Senate, claiming the existence of 16 “independent republics” escaping national sovereignty. 
The most important of these were Marquetalia39, Rio Chiquito, El Pato, Guayabero, Sumapaz, 
the region of Guariari and Vichada. This discourse started to affect Lleras Camargo’s 
government, “inventing the enemy” within the context of the germinating Doctrine of 
National Security. In June 1961 the IX Congress of the PCC approved of the necessity of 
combining all means of struggle (Pizarro, 1989: 27-9). 
 In 1962, the government implemented a military action towards the region of 
Marquetalia which was stopped shortly thereafter without explanations. On 27 May 1964, 
another attack was however firmly initiated, giving birth to the FARC. The operation was 
put into effect under the name of “Plan LASO” (Latin American Security Operation) 
(Pizarro, 1989: 34). The FARC’s narrative on Marquetalia stresses that a number of only 48 
peasants were attacked by as many as 16 000 soldiers in the “largest military operation of 
encirclement and extermination known up to that time,”40 advised and oriented by the U.S.A. 
This gives an impression resembling somehow that of David and Goliath, whereas the 
version of the Armed Forces presented by General Álvaro Valencia Tovar claims that only 
1500 men were employed in the attack (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 26-28).  
 The further development of the FARC will be addressed in the next chapter, as I 
address its non-economic organisational resources. This will however be done in a way that 
follows the indicators of organisational effectiveness listed earlier, and hardly 
chronologically in time. The development of the FARC can however be characterised by the 
following phases: 1) partisan guerrilla (1966-1977), 2) guerrilla in expansion (1977-1983), 3) 
the truce of the Patriotic Union (1984-1987), the reestablishment-conquest of nomadism and 
autonomy towards the PCC (1987-1990), from Casa Verde towards a national offensive 
                                                 
39 The denominated “independent republic” of Marquetalia was located in the very south of the 
department of Tolima. See appendix nr. 3.  
40 ”36 years for Peace and National Sovereignty”, the FARC’s webpage: http://www.farcep.org. 
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(1990-1993), and the intent to move towards a war of positions (1993-1998) (González, 
Bolívar and Vázquez, 2003: 54). I would add a last phase (1998- ongoing): Failed peace 
negotiations and a subsequent show-off of actual strength. The FARC seemingly wants to 
prove that it cannot be beaten militarily and that future negotiations will only be successful if 

































CHAPTER III: ORGANISATIONAL RESOURCES AND EFFECTIVENESS 
 
I will here through Clapham’s indicators give an account of the degree to which the FARC 
enjoys the organisational resources that are necessary for effectiveness. Altogether they also 
give a synopsis of the FARC organisational apparatus and recent history that will be drawn 
upon in later chapters. The two last indicators concerning relationship to host societies are 
however not included here, as they will rather be accounted for in the next chapter.  
 
Educated Leaders and a Clearly Defined Political Project  
 
The first indicator concerns education and the extent to which the group renders a defined 
political project. According to Clapham (1998: 9), education is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for organisational effectiveness. For example, he notes that there has been no case 
in which uneducated leaders have been able to create disciplined movements with clearly 
defined political projects.  
 The political project of the FARC was defined and dispersed by members of the PPC. 
In several occasions just before the attack on Marquetalia the party’s Central Committee sent 
support to the resistance through Jacobo Arenas and Hernando González (Matta, 1999: 142-
43). Arenas was a member of the Central Executive Committee (Comité Ejecutivo Central) 
of the PCC, and later got a notable position as an ideologue within the leadership of the 
FARC. González was the leader of the Communist Youth Party (la Juventud Comunista) 
(Ferro and Uribe41, 2002: 32).  
 In April 1964 during a meeting which both attended, a Secretariat was appointed for 
the resistance, consisting of four members: Manuel Marulanda Vélez (Tirofijo), Isauro Yosa 
(Lister), Jacobo Arenas and Hernando González (Matta, 2001: 144-45). According to 
Commander Simón Trinidad, the core of the peasant resistance could now define what would 
be the development of the group: to expand itself throughout the country and search for unity 
between the guerrilla vanguard and the Colombian people (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 27).  
 The FARC however claims not to be the armed branch of the PPC; and that the PCC 
is not the political branch of the FARC. The group was not created by an external institution; 
legitimation was always an internal matter (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 31-2). The FARC 
nevertheless received ideological guidance resulting in the adoption of Marxist-Leninist 
principles. Gutiérrez (2002: 13-14) doubts that the FARC has always been autonomous with 
respect to the PCC, and claims that this autonomy only came with the change of nature of the 
war- the emergence of drug trafficking and later the fall of the Soviet empire. Afterwards, 
                                                 
41 Ferro and Uribe’s work is also built up around testimonies given by FARC members. In line with 
Guaraca’s testimony, these must of course also be treated critically.  
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the FARC had to learn from other armed groups, such as the M-19. However, legitimation 
today certainly happens from within the FARC itself, which undoubtedly is an advantage. 
The organisation has taken a distance from the PCC, as the party does not agree with their 
armed struggle. According to the FARC, the PCC on its part has turned corrupt, too 
bureaucratic and caught up in electoral logic (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 144).  
  Among the seven members of the current Secretariat (Secretariado), four are 
professionals or have completed university studies, whereas three have a peasant origin 
(Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 81). It seems that Alfonso Cano has replaced Jacobo Arenas42 when 
it comes to ideological guidance, according to this quote 43  from an interview with 
Commander Fernando Caicedo (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 83):  “For example they say comrade 
Alfonso was the one that replaced Jacobo on the ideological ground (…)”. Simón Trinidad44 
is another example of a high-profiled FARC commander and spokesman with a high level of 
education; he was a professor of economics at Jorge Tadeo Lozano University in Bogotá for 
ten years before he joined the FARC in 1994 (Leech, 2000: 24-5).  
 As to Commander in Chief Manuel Marulanda Vélez, he is most often referred to as 
a military genius than a well educated leader, as illustrated by his nickname “Sure Shot” 
(Tirofijo). He has a peasant origin, and is said to represent the peasant. He has neither been 
characterised as particularly eloquent, nor with a protruding capacity of fascinating his 
audience (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 32). Commander Fernando Caycedo formulates it as 
follows: “(…) he is not a man who has advanced in the academy, his academy has been the 
life in the mountains leading troops, leading peasants, leading the struggle. The truth of our 
comrade’s history lies in his acts” (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 109).  
 Despite his lack of education, Marulanda is described as having also a grand political 
capacity and moral authority. According to the testimonies of some of the commanders of 
the FARC, he is an ideologist even if he has not normally been portrayed like one in the 
media. He studies the situation in Colombia and of the world, and he proposes and develops 
ideas (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 109). This is confirmed by Álvaro Leyva45, who last visited 
Marulanda in December 2005. Then Marulanda was 77 years old: “He is totally updated as 
to what goes on in Colombia and in the world through the media. (…) He listens 
                                                 
42 Jacobo Arenas died in 1990, possibly when the government attacked the Secretariat at Casa Verde. 
Another version of his death can be found in Molano, 1994: 199-200. 
43 My translation. All of the following translations of testimonies will be my own.   
44 Simón Trinidad was extradited to the U.S.A. on December the 31st 2004, and is currently undergoing 
a trial, accused of drug trafficking and of the kidnapping of three American contractors in February 
2003. The three Americans are still in the FARC’s control, and the Secretariat says it will not release 
them until Trinidad and other captured guerrilleros are released. Trinidad’s  real name is Ricardo 
Palmera . El Tiempo, 28 Feb., 2005 and 29 Jan., 2006.  
45 Álvaro Leyva is a conservative ex-minister who has met Marulanda a number of times, the first was 
in 1983. The context of his visit was a peace proposal that he is working on, which he calls “Noah’s 
Ark. “Tres días con Tirofijo”, magazine Semana, 28 February 2006. http://www.semana.com.  
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continuously to the radio and he tries to prioritise the tv news”. He also “skilfully writes on 
his laptop”.  
  Marulanda is moreover the oldest guerrillero in the world, and in 1998 he was 
appointed the title of “man of the year” by the magazine Semana for his capacity of 
influence on national life. The magazine explains that the title is not always given to people 
who are seen as good examples, and that for the first time they chose a person from outside 
the law (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 108-9).  
 The political project of the FARC has gone through stages. After the attack on 
Marquetalia on the 27th of May 1964, a basic document was developed: “The Agrarian 
Program”. This document according to Commander Simón Trinidad contains a synthesis of 
what happened to this group of peasants, and of their main objectives: a political solution, 
that they be listened to, and that their problems be solved (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 27-28).  
By the Second Conference in 1966, the FARC had developed a new, higher objective in 
which the Agrarian Program was only a part: to take over state power and to transform state 
structures. The group was now no longer to speak only of agrarian demands, but of social 
demands that would include all Colombians (Ferro and Uribe: 2002: 36-7). Importantly, this 
was the conference in which the organisation was organised under the name of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- 
FARC). Some sources therefore tell us that the organisation was founded in 1966, whereas 
the FARC itself46  uses the day of the attack on Marquetalia in 1964 as the date of its 
foundation. Further details on the political project of the FARC will be accounted for below 
as I address the development of the group generally.  
 The FARC no longer operates only in rural areas, which according to FARC member 
Julián Garcés can be seen as connected to the fact that 70 % of the Colombian population 
now live in urban centres. The FARC consequently also has had to direct its perspectives 
towards the cities, where the greatest part of Colombians actually reside. There is now also a 
growing tendency of recruitment of people from the cities that have higher levels of 
education (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 63-5). 
 The FARC moreover claims to be a political-military organisation, meaning that all 
members should have both political and military skills. There is no such thing as a separate 
political or military section within the organisation (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 49). Political 
skills are however not always easy to inculcate considering the low level of education among 
many of the combatants. The expression “The FARC is a military giant and a political 
dwarf”, although an exaggeration, illustrates the problem. It is difficult to be a warrior and 
implement the work of a social organisation at the same time. The FARC in the past few 
                                                 
46 “Our History”, the FARC’s web page. 
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years has tried to fill this vacuum with the foundation of two clandestine movements under 
their direct direction: the Colombian Clandestine Communist Party (el Partido Comunista 
Colombiano Clandestino- PCCC) and The Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia 
(Movimiento Bolivariano por una Nueva Colombia) (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 146-8).  
     
Development of the Group and Dispensability of the Leader 
 
Clapham (1998: 9) further claims that the ultimate indicator of organisational effectiveness is 
the way in which organisations develop or decay over time. Moreover, the decisive test of 
leadership is dispensability; the capacity of keeping the organisation together even if the 
leader should die or disappear. 
 The First Conference of the FARC was arranged the year of the attack on 
Marquetalia, and the guerrilla group was given the name of the Southern Bloc (Bloque Sur). 
The Southern Bloc consisted of the following commands of resistance: Marquetalia, Rio 
Chiquito, 26 de Septiembre, Pato and Guayabero (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 34). By the Fifth 
Conference in 1974, the FARC operated through four fronts, whereas in 1982, by the 
Seventh Conference, the group had created 24 fronts. The expansion continued even more 
rapidly, and in 2001, there were more than 60 fronts that covered areas nearly all over the 
Colombian territory. By 2004, the FARC had between eighteen and twenty thousand 
members (Gutiérrez, 2004: 264-5). At the same time, the FARC “remains united, fights well, 
and holds tight in difficult situations” (freely from Gutérrez, 2004: 27947). The FARC has 
managed to go through huge changes while at the same time improving its relative economic 
and military strength.  
 The FARC also has a history of peace talks that have had their impact on the 
organisation. As we have seen, talks began during the presidency of Belisario Betancur 
(1982-1986), in the course of which the FARC was offered legalisation of its political 
activity. The idea was to convert the organisation’s military force into a political party, and  
as a result there was a ceasefire in 1984. The FARC then renounced kidnapping. The 
extermination of the Patriotic Union (UP), however, meant to the FARC a closure of the 
legal democratic window (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 116) and the opening of a totally different 
one: Under the umbrella of the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Movement Coordinating Body48 
(Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar-CGSB) the FARC could further extend its actions 
(Leal, 2004: 91, 104).  
                                                 
47 All translations from Spanish into English are my own when no other source of translation is 
mentioned.  
48  This translation was found on the internet pages of the Center for International Policy, 
http://www.ciponline.org 
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 Later, Cesar Gaviria’s decision to attack the headquarter of the Secretariat in Casa 
Verde in 1990 resulted in an immense expansion of the FARC in its military structure 
according to Commander Raúl Reyes (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 116-17). New, unsuccessful 
talks in Carácas, Venezuela in 1991 and in Tlaxcala, Mexico in 1992 did not help diminish 
this expansion (Pécaut, 2004: 85). Commander Fernando Caycedo explains that the military 
strategy decided upon at the Eighth Conference in 1993 was to be known as a ‘war of 
movement’, which meant to besiege, to hit, catch off guard and then leave (Ferro and Uribe, 
2002: 117).  
 The corruption scandal related to the electoral campaign of President Ernesto 
Samper in 1994 led to a political crisis and favoured further expansion of the conflict. 
Between 1995 and 1998, the FARC’s military operations would involve hundreds of 
combatants, leaving traditional guerrilla tactics behind and leading the Army to suffer 
crushing defeats (Pécaut, 2004: 85). 
 The talks during the presidency of Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) left the FARC in 
total control of the demilitarised zone that was provided. After the rupture of the dialogues, 
the FARC has been sharpening its military confrontations (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 118). 
Since the start of the presidency of Álvaro Uribe, the organisation has been threatening and 
terrorising municipal authorities in order to jeopardise the governance of the country (Leal, 
2004: 102).  In spite of President Uribe’s rough line and the government’s Patriotic Plan, it is 
difficult to say if the FARC have grown any weaker. The organisation has adopted new 
strategies, taking advantage of the fact that it is impossible for the militaries to be physically 
present in all of the huge Colombian jungle areas.  
 The FARC’s development and history, especially the foundational event of 
Marquetalia, make up a substantial organisational resource. The repression that took place in 
the 1950s, the government attacks on Marquetalia, and also the fate of the Patriotic Union 
help the organisation legitimise and justify its actions. This point will be further addressed in 
chapter 5.   
 Manuel Marulanda Vélez is a leader who according to Commander Iván Ríos has a 
humble appearance, free of snobbishness. He does not like to create artificial images of 
himself through the media (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 110). Ferro and Uribe (2002:112) see this 
manner of projecting leadership as a weakness, in that there is a loss of efficiency in the 
transmission of messages to the Colombian people. As this might be true as to the popularity 
of the organisation among non-members, it is indeed a strength when it comes to 
organisational effectiveness; it contributes to the dispensability of the leader.  
 The type of leadership exercised by Marulanda has namely not created dependence 
towards him; he operates through the education of commanders and combatants within the 
internal dynamics of consultations and team work. Neither did Jacobo Arenas’ death affect 
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the unity of the organisation (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 110-11). Commander Iván Ríos 
explains: “(….) the political course does not depend on one man; the political course 
depends on a collective which is the one that designs that political course; and that is called 
the ‘Conference’ (…) (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 111)”. 
 The Conservative politician Álvaro Leyva who visited the FARC’s Commander in 
Chief in December 2005 in order to discuss his peace proposal, was a witness to the way that 
Marulanda operates during consultations with the other members of the Secretariat. After the 
two had gone through Leyva’s proposal, Marulanda said he would like to hear the other six 
members’ comments to the peace formulas in question. In less than 24 hours all were able to 
give their written comments; which was impressive considering the geographical difficulties 
of the areas where several of the members of the Secretariat operate.   
 Summing up, the FARC has survived and adapted very well to changes, on which I 
will go more into detail below. At the same time the group has not depended only on the 
leader in the continuation of its political and military course.  
 
 
Common Principles and Goals, Effective Structures  
 
Issues of personal leadership will be less critical when the members share a commitment to 
common principles and goals and receive formalised training on these (Clapham, 1998: 10). 
Where formal structures such as command councils, hierarchies, and military formations 
possess some autonomy of their own, there will be a higher degree of effectiveness. 
  The military organisms of the FARC are at the same time political, as mentioned 
above. Every military unit is thereby also called a political cell (célula política). According 
to Commander Fernando Caicedo, every cell has a political secretary and a secretary of 
propaganda, and all members of the cell meet every two weeks to make decisions 
democratically. The cell also dedicates an hour or half on the study of a text, such as the 
analysis of the last letter written by Marulanda to the President of Colombia. What’s more, 
they study what they call the Bolivarian 49  Cathedra (Cátedra Bolivariana) and other 
documents, their own magazine, and articles from their radio channels (Ferro and Uribe, 
2002:43).   
 According to Commander Simón Trinidad, an especially important task is to 
equalise the political and the military skills so that the members have enough of both (Ferro 
and Uribe, 2002: 83). Another difficulty lies in the equalising of knowledge and practical 
skills between combatants with rural and urban backgrounds. Those with urban backgrounds 
                                                 
49  ‘Bolivarian’ - originates in Simón Bolívar, who liberated Colombia from the Spanish. More 
information on the influence of Bolívar will be given below.  
 41 
must learn to walk in the mountains, to fell trees, etc, while the ones coming from rural areas 
must acquire academic and political knowledge. The low level of education among the 
combatants coming from rural areas can be a challenge which is not always overcome (Ferro 
and Uribe, 2002: 84).  
 Another political decision-making organism consists of the general assemblies of 
fronts, who meet minimum once a year. Here disciplinary problems are resolved and the 
theses suggested by the Secretariat discussed. The principal task of the general assemblies is 
however to choose the delegates for the National Conference of the Guerrillas (Conferencia 
Nacional de Guerrilleros) (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 43). The Conference is the maximum 
authority of the FARC, and its delegates can be elected among all the members of the 
organisation. The conference should be held every four years, but because of security 
problems it is held when the conditions permit so. It is organised by the Secretariat, and it 
should define the political and military plans of the organisation and appoint the Central 
General Staff (Estado Mayor Central- EMC).  
 The Central General Staff has 25 members, and it is the superior organism of 
direction and commands. It appoints the Secretariat, adjusts the plans for the conference, 
takes financial decisions and appoints the commanders of the General Staff of Fronts and 
Blocs. Meetings take place whenever considered necessary (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 46).  
 A front consists of more than one column, which again comprises two or more 
companies50. The number of combatants is not fixed, as the front is organised by occupied 
land and not by number of combatants. The General Staff of Front comprises five 
commanders.  
 A bloc consists of five or more fronts and it coordinates and unifies the activity of 
fronts in a specific area in order to develop strategic plans. The General Staff of Bloc 
coordinates the military campaigns and the plans elaborated at the conferences in their 
respective areas of bloc, and they control the development of the specific plans of their fronts. 
The blocs are under the direction of the Central General Staff or its Secretariat. Moreover, 
there are two Joint Commands (Comandos Conjuntos), the Central and the Occidental, that 
coordinate the activities of the fronts in their corresponding areas. These function when all 
the conditions for a bloc to be created are not present. They have a coordinator instead of a 
commander and they depend directly on the Central General Staff or on its Secretariat (Ferro 
and Uribe, 2002: 50-52) 
 The Secretariat comprises seven commanders. It is the maximum authority in 
between the general assemblies and it is in charge of putting the conference’s directives into 
effect. Today it is integrated by: Manuel Marulanda Vélez, commander in chief; Alfonso 
                                                 
50 A company is made up of two guerrilla units and their commands, each consisting of 26 combatants. 
Hence, a company comprises 54 combatants.  
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Cano, Raúl Reyes, Iván Márquez, Jorge Briceño51, Timoleón Jiménez52 and Efraín Guzmán. 
According to Commander Iván Ríos, the Secretariat has great authority and autonomy, but 
its members can be replaced by the Central General Staff in plenary in case of misbehaviour. 
Moreover, all the members of the Secretariat except for Marulanda are at the same time 
commanders of blocs. Thus, they are able to stay in touch with the processes of the FARC 
and to control these not by reasoning power alone (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 47-8). Even if the 
members are not at the same place, there are good mechanisms of communication between 
them, such as witnessed by Álvaro Leyva in the example above.  
 As we have seen, the commanders of blocs are mostly made up of members of the 
Secretariat. The commanders of fronts also have great responsibilities. According to 
Commander Fernando Caicedo, the responsibilities that are undertaken within the 
organisation are called carteras53. The carteras of a commander of front are far- reaching: 
finances, intelligence, communication, organisational plans, arms, logistics, health care, and 
propaganda in addition to being chief of personnel (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 49). 
 It can be concluded from the above that the FARC has a centralised command 
structure; its political-military units are indeed subject to decisions and control issued by the 
Secretariat. However, the commanders of fronts have extensive tasks and responsibilities, 
and thereby possess considerable autonomy of their own. Moreover, the regular meetings 
that take place within every unit of the organisation, as well as the general assemblies, give 
some evidence of a quite orderly organisation where every member has the chance to speak. 
The regular sessions of analyses and studies of doctrine contribute to the identification and 
indoctrination of common principles and goals.  
  Ferro and Uribe (2002: 52-4) argue, however,  that the tasks and rhythms of war 
require a controlled space of study, reflection and discussion concerning the politics of the 
organisation more often than in a state democracy. The democratic institution of the 
Conference loses influence because it cannot be organised often enough. The decisions are 
thereby taken by the Secretariat, perhaps reducing the possibilities of satisfying the 





                                                 
51 Jorge Briceño’s nick name is ’Mono Jojoy’. 
52 Timoleón Jiménez’ real name is Rodrigo Londoño-Echeverry. He also has an other nick name; 
‘Timochenko’.  
53 The literal meaning of cartera is ‘bag’ or ‘wallet’. Here I would translate it with ‘post’ or ‘task’.   
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Ability to Stay United: Coherence and Level of Discipline 
 
The ability to stay united in a rebel organisation is crucial. From the way that the FARC has 
developed over time, we have already seen that the FARC has stayed united and grown in 
number.  
 There are few accounts of serious splits, apart from a small number of people 
abandoning the organisation with a handful of dollars (Gutiérrez, 2004: 268). According to a 
report elaborated by the Joint Intelligence Committee of Colombia (Junta de Inteligencia 
Conjunta)54 for year 2003, 1.24 % of the FARC’s expenses stems from lost armaments given 
away by combatants who escape the organisation’s ranks in order to join the Colombian 
Ministry of Defence’s demobilisation program.  
 There is however one example of a particular split that is more salient than others: 
the creation of the guerrilla group “Ricardo Franco” by dissident FARC member Javier 
Delgado55 at the beginning of the 1980s (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 58). While Delgado was 
still a member of the FARC, he was seen as very intelligent and competent and was entrusted 
the creation of urban groups. The first disagreements with the FARC came when he wanted 
to increase military attacks. He then accused the Communist Party of being responsible for 
the military inactivity of the FARC, and left the organisation bringing with him 1.200 
million pesos and a number of combatants. The dissident group then tried to assassinate 
Hernando Hurtado from the Central Committee of the PCC, without luck.56 What Delgado is 
most remembered for, however, is the massacre of Tacueyó in November 1985, in which 164 
guerrillas from his own group were killed, allegedly for being infiltrators (Ferro and Uribe, 
2002: 58). He virtually exterminated his own guerrilla group and ran off to Panamá, but later 
returned to Colombia and was captured in Cali in 1995. In 2002 he was found dead in his 
prison cell, a death for which the FARC has claimed responsibility.57 
  The question is along which lines there was a split between the FARC and Delgado 
as well as the combatants he brought with him. Remembering Clapham’s account of 
coherence, splits are good indicators of the lines on which an organisation is organised.  It 
may be concluded from this case that it was a political split; there was a disagreement on 
whether the FARC should carry out more military activities. Delgado disagreed not only 
with the Secretariat, but also with the PCC. However, as this is the only known serious split 
within the FARC, it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to whether this implies that the 
                                                 
54 ”Estimación de los ingresos y egresos de las FARC durante 2003 basados en información de 
inteligencia recolectada por las agencias del estado”, Bogotá D. C. 24 February 2005, 
http://usregsec.sdsu.edu/docs/Junta_de_InteligenciaFeb2005.pdf, accessed 14 September 2006. 
55 Javier Delgado’s real name was José Fedor Rey Álvarez. 
56 “Obituario de José Fedor Rey, ‘Javier Delgado’” in El Mundo 4 July 2002, http://www.elmundo.es 
57 ”Colombia- Las FARC se atribuyen el asesinato del ”monstruo de los Andes”, ex rebelde disidente 
(...)”, in Europa Press- Servicio Latinoamericano, 30 June 2002. http://www.europapress.es 
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FARC is organised on political lines more than on personal or other lines. The case of Javier 
Delgado is an extreme one, which can be illustrated by the following formulations by a 
journalist of The Times58 in 1986:  
  
It is a measure of paranoia that he claims pre-posterously that the 164 ‘little runts’ executed 
were paid informers of the military who had infiltrated the ranks of the ‘Francos’, a group 
whose numbers have never exceeded 200. (…) Delgado stands alone. He has declared war not 
only on the government, the oligarchy and the armed forces, but also on FARC, the 
Communist Party and the left in general for ‘betraying’ the revolutionary cause. 
 
According to Commander Fernando Caicedo, the problem was that the control over urban 
fronts is not as good as that over rural fronts. As we have seen, Javier Delgado was operating 
in urban areas where he was more difficult to reach. This incident marked off a milestone in 
the loss of legitimacy of the FARC and their ethical dimension among public opinion (Ferro 
and Uribe, 2002: 59).  
 The FARC however have control mechanisms related to their level of discipline, 
combatants are not stimulated with material goods, and they receive no fixed salary. 
Commander Fernando Caicedo explains (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 59-60):  
 
What has to do with material stimuli, that people are motivated because they dress better, 
because they eat better, because they have a more luxurious weapon, because they have 
access to more sophisticated means of work, now that can start to generate problems, 
deviations that do not correspond, well, really what is needed of people is an understanding of 
the fact that one does not suffer in order to suffer, that we are not a sect, nor monks, nor are 
we studying to be clergymen, but we do handle some resources which belong to the 
organisation and to all the people, because they are for the benefit of a very noble cause.  
  
Similarly, a member of the FARC who in 1999 was responsible for implementing order in 
the Caguán area, says that in order to avoid bribe, his first decision was to prohibit any 
FARC members to wear valuable necklaces given to them as presents: “They give it to me 
and I give it to the Secretariat” (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 60-1). 
  According to Commander Iván Ríos, the combatants are stimulated morally. For 
example when someone has drawn notice to him- or herself as a good fighter, he or she will 
be put in front of the troop. Likewise, advancement in the organisation is a type of stimulus 
that is given when it is earned. Thus, the organisation hopes to slow down tendencies of 
social climbing (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 88-9). There are also stimuli such as: awards, 
belonging to strategic companies, participating in specialisation courses, etc. Moreover, 
members are kept well fed and in good condition (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 90-1). This all 
contributes to the group staying united. All in all, the FARC seems to inherit the requirement 
                                                 
58 Geoffrey Matthews: ”Spectrum: Massacre in the Andes”, 17 March 1986 
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of coherence to a considerable degree, with few exceptions. In order to further explore the 
level of coherence, I will now turn to the most important disciplinary practices of the FARC.  
 According to Rangel 59 , the FARC is a very integrated organisation with great 
internal consistency, in which verticality and discipline prevail. Defections are not tolerated 
and there are many coercive mechanisms at all levels of the organisation that help instruct 
political, military and organisational decisions made by the Secretariat. The fronts are very 
well controlled, and so are the finances.  
 The Regulations of disciplinary regimen of the FARC describe the different control 
mechanisms of the organisation. There is a political or military sanction for every type of 
offence or misdemeanour. According to Commander Fernando Caycedo, the offence is first 
taken up in the cell, then step by step up through the hierarchy until reaching the Secretariat. 
There is also a vertical disciplinary body within the FARC called the Relation (La Relación) 
which every day treats the offences that come up. In the Relation there is no democracy. 
Every morning there is also a meeting between the commanding units in order to balance the 
work of the day before and plan the next. If a decision will affect political life, it goes to the 
cell in order for the latter to give its opinion. An offence can then be sanctioned both 
militarily and politically (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 57-8).  
 It should also be said that the FARC demands life militancy; leaving the organisation 
is extremely difficult. Despite this fact, recruitment in its majority is voluntary, as FARC 
leaders state that forced recruits are dangerous because they can switch sides. The combat 
morale is moreover relatively high, and individual desertion has not been massive (Gutiérrez, 
2004: 269-71)  
 As we have seen, Clapham (1998: 11) mentions the level of discipline of child 
soldiers as a particularly good indicator of the level of discipline of the organisation as a 
whole. These children often come from traumatic backgrounds, but to some degree they will 
behave according to the different organisational ethos of different insurgencies, as 
exemplified by the behaviour of child soldiers in for instance Ethiopia and Sierra Leone. In 
Ethiopa they acted with a level of discipline beyond that of the regular armed forces, 
whereas in Sierra Leone they were responsible for horrible atrocities.  
 Human Rights Watch has made a report 60  about child soldiers in Colombia’s 
irregular armed groups, the FARC included. According to the report, the children’s accounts 
reinforce the impression of the FARC as a highly vertical, organised and disciplined military 
force. The abuses committed by the guerrillas are therefore unlikely to be the product of 
                                                 
59 Alfredo Rangel Suárez, Director of the Foundation of  Security and Democracy (La Fundación 
Seguridad y Democracia), http://www.seguridadydemocracia.org, Bogotá, Colombia. Personal 
correspondence.  
60 ”You’ll Learn Not To Cry”. Child Combatants in Colombia. Human Rights Watch, September 2003, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903/. Accessed 2 October 2006. 
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misconduct, but rather the result of specific orders that have been carried out. The report 
describes how the FARC holds “war councils” in order to punish capital offences61. These 
are in fact more like summary executions dressed up as judicial procedures, making up 
abhorrent violations of international humanitarian law. When the war council has passed a 
sentence, a review mechanism such as that described by Commander Caycedo is carried out: 
the company commander communicates the decision to his or her superior officers, then the 
superiors order the sentence to be authorised or not. This indicates that executions are mostly 
authorised by top commanders. Then the execution can proceed, and a few members of the 
company are picked out to complete it. Apart from executions, there are other types of 
punishment such as being chained to trees for weeks, digging garbage pits, trenches, or 
latrines for days on end, carrying piles of wood, etc.  
 It speaks for itself that the descriptions made by HRW are absent in the accounts 
made by FARC commanders in Ferro and Uribe’s work. Apart from the fact that the FARC 
punishes its own combatants, Ferro and Uribe report of “revolutionary justice” being applied 
to innocent civilians several times during their field work, and even people they knew were 
executed between 1997 and 2001. It is hard to establish whether orders from the highest 
level of the hierarchy or orders coming from an intermediate level of direction are the ones 
that result in the application of “revolutionary justice” to innocent people. It is nevertheless 
important to remember that FARC leaders will try to make their testimonies fit the overall 
narratives and identity of the organisation, and therefore, their statements cannot always be 
trusted. If the leadership of the organisation makes a mistake, it is always easy to blame the 
intermediate levels of the organisation, as this will be less damaging to the organisation as a 
whole. It is easier to accept members in the lower ranks of an organisation as “only human 
beings” (human beings make mistakes) than those in the higher ones. According to Aguilera 
(2003: 12), the reverence for Marulanda and his slow conversion into a legend has made the 
possibility of identifying his mistakes increasingly difficult. Member of the Secretariat 
Alfonso Cano has stated that Marulanda, on the other hand, never forgets the mistakes of 
others; something that Cano considers a quality rather than a defect. The general conclusion 
concerning level of discipline within the FARC is that the organisational ethos of the 
organisation does not permit undisciplined behaviour, and that punishment in case of 
misconduct is severe. 
  
                                                 
61 The most serious infractions of the FARC’s military code are, according to the HRW report: falling 
asleep while on guard duty, trying to run away or being absent without leave, surrender, loss of a 
weapon, being an informer or infiltrator, using a weapon against a fellow combatant, firing guns in 
populated areas, robbery, extortion, or violence against the civilian population, repeated drug or 
alcohol abuse, and rape. These ‘capital offences’ are punishable by execution without regards to the 
offender’s age.  
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CHAPTER IV: THE FARC’S WAR ECONOMY AS SOCIAL INTERACTION 
 
This chapter will show how economic resources are important to the overall functioning of 
the FARC, while at the same time these cannot alone account for the onset of conflict, nor 
the creation, recruitment and effectiveness of this particular insurgent group. The FARC’s 
most important war economic activities will be accounted for in this chapter, but these will 
rather be seen as social interaction within a social order of violence beyond the state that 
comes close to a quasi-state system (Bakonyi and Stuvøy, 2005: 359). Knowledge about the 
organisational functioning of the FARC will give evidence that Collier and Hoeffler’s 
accounts of opportunity and greed are overly simplistic. I will treat the illegal resource of 
coca especially, in order to recount the complex social interaction that takes place within 
such an important part of the FARC’s war economy. At the end of the chapter I will see the 
FARC’s economic activities in relationship to the requirements of a quasi-sate system.  
 
The FARC’s System of Economic Reproduction   
 
Rangel, following Naylor (1993: 13-51), summarises the FARC’s means of obtaining 
resources as predatory, parasitic and symbiotic (Rangel, 1999: 29). These categories are 
determined by the relationship to host societies, by the respective regional economy, as well 
as the state’s capacity of control in the area of relevance. The predatory type of financing is 
accordingly seen in areas where the FARC has no influence over its host society and its own 
presence is sporadic and occasional, making it vulnerable to the coercive state apparatus. 
Ways of subtraction are assaults, cattle theft, kidnapping and extortion. The parasitic type 
requires more of a long term infiltration into formal society and some active and passive 
support from within it. The coercion produced by such a long term armed presence makes it 
possible to demand payment for services of vigilance, to extort public officials and 
contractors, etc. The symbiotic type of financing is the most advanced of the three and 
happens where the state’s presence is weak or non-existent; in territories where the FARC 
has almost total control. Part of the FARC’s success and deep-seatedness has to do with the 
fact that it has been a constructor of territories in areas of low population density, filling up 
the territorial deficit that the state still does not take appropriation of. The guerrilla group in 
these areas can carry out its own economic activities related to drug trafficking, mining (gold, 
emeralds, etc.), agriculture, stockbreeding, and the collection of revolutionary taxes. (Rangel, 
2001: 384-389; 1999: 29-31).  
 The FARC has managed to adapt successfully to structural changes within the 
Colombian economy, to create ties with international markets; to maintain an efficient and 
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stable war economy while at the same time extracting resources in convenient proportions on 
the basis of rational calculations. Moreover, a high percentage of the resources is not spent 
immediately, but is rather invested in various ways into the formal economy, both at the 
local, national, and international levels (Rangel, 2001:389-90; 1999: 31). 
 The most important of the FARC’s economic activities are kidnapping, extortion, 
and income deriving from the drug business. According to the Joint Intelligence Committee 
of Colombia (Junta de Inteligencia Conjunta)62, the marketing of cocaine hydrochloride in 
year 2003 represented 45.49 % of the FARC’s total income, whereas extortion made up 
41.31 %,  kidnapping 6.75 %, investment output 3.04 %, and cattle theft 1.39 %. To give us 
an idea, the estimated maximum income from cocaine hydrochloride for 2003 according to 
the report was approximately 1 700 billion pesos or  600 million dollars. I will here have a 
short look at the three most important activities: drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping. 
 Drug trafficking: the FARC is not a drug cartel in a strict sense, but has rather 
established a tax system covering every phase of the industry in an archetypical case of 
symbiosis between the insurgents and the regional economy. Supplies have to go through 
control posts, and there are fixed taxes for each ton or gallon of cement, gasoline, sulphuric 
acid, and other raw materials. Cultivators of coca who have more than four hectares of land 
pay according to the extension of their crops, whereas processors pay according to the 
weight of the coca paste or cocaine. This tax is known as gramaje63, but there are also taxes 
for taking the merchandise out of the area, be it by plane, boat or by road, and for using 
runways and landing strips (Rangel, 2001: 401-3).  
 According to Ferro and Uribe (2002: 98), the FARC has however gone from 
collecting taxes to turning into merchants in the lower area of the river Caguán (see appendix 
nr. 3). This means that the guerrilla group buys from the producers of basic paste and sells to 
bigger merchants. This practice has been further extended to the whole department of 
Caquetá, although it is not something the organisation likes to admit. Local drug traffickers 
probably sell to someone bigger and more powerful who again finances paramilitary groups 
in other regions (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 98). It seems like the FARC is indeed following the 
mercantile logics of selling to anyone in order to obtain the resources to keep the war going. 
In August 2005, the Colombian Army according to the newspaper El Tiempo64 discovered 
3.8 tons of cocaine in a wine cellar in Bogotá stamped with a Farian symbol. A stamp of a 
                                                 
62 ”Estimación de los ingresos y egresos de las FARC durante 2003 basados en información de 
inteligencia recolectada por las agencias del estado”, Bogotá D. C. 24 February 2005, 
http://usregsec.sdsu.edu/docs/Junta_de_InteligenciaFeb2005.pdf, accessed 14 September 2006. 
6363 Gramaje literally means weight (in grams).  
64 ”Las Farc también tenían su tajada en la carga de coca incautada por las autoridades en Bogotá”, 3 
September 2005. 
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sun simulating a sunset in the llanos65 confirms the sale of cocaine to a faction of a drug 
cartel from the north of Valle which again has another ally, namely the paramilitaries of 
Casanare.  According to Rangel (2001: 403), however, such functional alliances are purely 
temporary and localised, while the enmity between the FARC and the paramilitaries is long 
term and of extreme hostility. 
 Extortion:  This means of obtaining resources is first and foremost parasitic on the 
formal economy. Sometimes extortion is also the prior step towards kidnapping, if the victim 
refuses to pay what he or she is asked. The majority nonetheless give up in view of the 
guerrilla’s pressure, paying a fixed annual amount or a variable amount depending on sales 
and production. This again gives the FARC a chance to plan for the flow of resources that it 
will receive over a year. The extortion of the ranching and agricultural sector is known as 
vacuna
66, and it depends on the patrimony, size, and productivity of the land as well as the 
owner’s degree of cooperation with local fronts. The FARC will protect the property against 
cattle theft, land invaders, and other extortionists and thieves (Rangel, 2001: 396-400).  
 Other sectors are also extorted, to mention but a few the mining industries and the 
transportation sector. In areas where the FARC enjoys tight control, there is no passenger 
transportation company that does not pay extortion. The public sector is neither exempt from 
it, as one of the political strategies of the FARC is to take control over municipal local power. 
Hence, the guerrilla decides where public money goes, and to which companies contracts are 
handed out (Rangel, 2001: 398-400).  
 Kidnapping: This is the principal form of predatory action against the Colombian 
formal economy. About half of the kidnappings occurring in the world today are carried out 
in Colombia, and about half of these are executed by guerrilla groups (principally the FARC 
and the ELN). Potential victims are no longer just wealthy people; nowadays any person 
from the middle class is in possible danger. Kidnapping has become almost an industrial 
process, and the guerrillas have experts for every phase of it. They also have highly 
advanced communication equipment, which is used in order to access privileged information 
from official entities and thereby construct very complete data bases used to carry out both 
individual and collective kidnappings. Collective kidnappings are known in the Colombian 
news media as pescas milagrosas, meaning “miraculous fishing”. During the latter, hundreds 
of cars are stopped on the road, and the guerrillas with the help of portable computers use its 
data bases to select its victims one by one. In urban areas kidnappings are often executed by 
criminal gangs subcontracted by the guerrilla who later deliver the victim. The average 
ransom for Colombian victims is around a hundred thousand dollars, whereas for foreigners 
                                                 
65 Llanos means level country; plains.  
66 Vacuna literally means vaccine, vaccination. 
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it is sometimes fifteen times higher. On average, every fifth victim is a foreigner (Rangel, 
2001: 392-395).  
 The FARC’s expenditure is mostly represented by chemical consumables used in the 
processing of narcotics 67 , the purchase and maintenance of military equipment, team 
provisions, food provision, logistics sustenance and infrastructure. It is presumed that the 
FARC is moreover constructing its own military industry by way of establishing workshops 
in which cartridges and mortar shells are to be produced and rifles to be repaired. Part of its 
spending is also destined towards a system of social security, in order to give retired 
guerrillas a pension or economic support to their families, and to be able to treat those who 
have been wounded in combat (Rangel, 2001, 403-4). FARC combatants however do not 
receive a fixed salary (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 90).    
 The economic resources acquired by the FARC, including personal gifts, are 
considered collective property. Plans for the administration of resources are elaborated by 
the National Conference of the Guerrillas, and their implementation is the responsibility of 
the Central General Staff, its Secretariat, as well as the general staff of blocs and fronts. 
From 1985 on, the FARC’s finances were centralised, and particular budgets were to be 
devised for each bloc, front, and commission, with strict bureaucratic control over those 
handling the finances. This has avoided economic differences between fronts, whereas 
before this centralisation some fronts in areas of high income would enjoy better quality of 
life (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 103-6).   
 
Economic Activities as Social Interaction 
 
The FARC’s flow of resources has political advantages. According to Rangel (1999: 97), the 
FARC is not willing to respect international humanitarian law because such a compromise 
would abruptly undermine the flow of resources necessary for its political activity and 
military expansion. The political cost would be so high that it seems difficult for the guerrilla 
group to pay that price. Rangel thus makes it clear that economy plays a vital role in the 
political project of this guerrilla group; that economy and politics are closely intertwined. 
Knowing that the control over resources is extremely tight, an emphasis on individual 
economic gains such as presented by Collier and Hoeffler is not feasible.   
 Symbolic aspects, which are also overlooked in the quantitative approach of 
economic agendas, are  extremely important in the FARC’s centralised administration of 
resources in that it is actually related to the “revolutionary mysticism”  (Ferro and Uribe, 
                                                 
67 According to the Joint Intelligence Committee’s report referred to earlier, this category represents 
as much as 38.55 % of the FARC’s total expenditure.  
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2002:105). Whenever this administration is managed in a way that promotes the criteria of 
equity, solidarity, transparency and efficiency, it is coherent with the organisation’s design of 
an economic model for the country as a whole and hence it reinforces the organisational 
mysticism. The FARC’s members then feel that they are living according to the 
organisation’s principles and socioeconomic objectives (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 105-108). 
 This interdependent web of social interaction across political, economic and 
symbolic spheres is what Bakonyi and Stuvøy (2005: 364) conceptualise as a social order of 
violence beyond the state. The basis of the FARC’s organisational effectiveness is indeed 
founded upon all three spheres, as was shown in the former chapter. These aspects do affect 
one another, such that for instance more concern with economic resources may have 
weakened the concern for the civilian population. What Collier and Hoeffler fail to explain is 
however why FARC members risk their lives, give up their families, stay united; why so few 
run away with the organisation’s money and why they agree to join the organisation in the 
first place, considering the fact that they receive no salary and that they are not allowed to 
take booty after an attack (Gutiérrez, 2004: 269). They fail to do this because their 
quantitative approach loses out on the role of social constraints, principles, norms, rules and 
a sense of a collective identity; on how these actually affect economic activities.  
 Without organisational resource of having a clearly defined political project, 
established principles and organisational structures, as well as a proven ability to stay united, 
the FARC would not be able to carry out effective actions of war. It would neither be able to 
increase its economic resources in such a stable manner as it does today. However, the 
organisational effectiveness would also not be possible at the same scale without access to 
economic resources. Importantly, economic reproduction is implemented in such a way that 
it actually reinforces the combatants’ sense of belonging to a strong political cause. The 
money that not necessarily has to be spent, is invested in order to reach long-term political 
goals. An abundance of resources is therefore not an obstacle for internal cohesion within 
this particular guerrilla group. This is very interesting when taking some influential research 
findings into account. The International Peace Academy in their 2004 report of economic 
agendas in civil wars (Ballentine, 2004) claimed that “the more that state and non-state 
combatants depend on the predatory exploitation of natural resources and other wealth, the 
more susceptible they become to corrosion of internal coherence and discipline (…)“. 
Although predatory ways of obtaining resources, such as kidnapping, have awakened 
considerable repulsion among large parts of the civilian population68, corrosion seemingly is 
not the case when it comes to the internal coherence of the FARC. This fact further proves 
                                                 
68 A quite recent investigation carried out by the Institute of Political Studies and International 
Relations at the Universidad Nacional in Bogotá, concludes that Colombians “confide very little in 
the guerrillas” (El Tiempo, 24 September, 2005).  
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the necessity of looking into the factors that promote organisational effectives, in order to 
comprehend the complex dynamics of none-state armed actors. 
   
The Coca Economy and the Cocalero Campesinos 
 
“When armed actors direct the exploitation of a legal or illegal crop, they are also 
participating in politics; they are putting together social groups and building forms of 
identity” (Bolívar, 2003: 26).  
 The Colombian cocalero campesinos69  who are under the control of the FARC 
belong to such a social group, but the forms of identification with the FARC are varied. I 
will employ two of Clapham’s indicators that I previously left out in order to illustrate this 
complex social interaction, namely 1) relationship of common interest and 2) whether the 
members of the guerrilla group live together with its host society on a daily basis, living and 
eating like the peasantry, and whether they are “bombed together”. 
 The FARC controls large areas of the Colombian territory over which the State has 
been incapable of extending its authority. In some of the regions where coca is grown today, 
such as Putumayo, Caquetá and Guaviare (see appendix 1), there has been no state control 
beyond a small police force in the municipal urban centres. Coca producers from these 
regions claim that the only authority they ever knew, prior to the introduction of coca, was 
that of the guerrillas. The FARC in the early 1970s filled the vacuum in these areas, which 
became the guerrillas’ strongholds (Richani, 2003: 20). Where people are accustomed to 
FARC rules, it can indeed be hard for the regular armed forces to gain support. In Cartagena 
del Chairá, a village in Caquetá of some 8000 people (see appendix 4), a peasant remarked 
the following when an army soldier tried to explain that the Army and the guerrillas were 
two very different things: “You know what? Here everybody has grown up with the idea of 
the authority of the guerrillas. Another generation that recognises the authority of the Army 
has yet to come”70.  
 The relationship between the FARC and its host societies in these areas is however a 
complex one. The involvement in the drug economy has created strong contradictions: on the 
one hand it has created problems of insecurity in the area, on the other, the cocalero 
campesinos have a viable means of income in areas where infrastructure is scarce and 
unemployment is high. 
                                                 
69 Ramírez (2005: 76) defines the term ‘cocalero campesinos’ as referring to the identity of small 
peasants (cultivating up to three hectares of coca) who have been fighting to be differentiated as a 
social group.   
70 Article by Pilar Lozano: “Cinco años para derrotar a las FARC”, El País, Madrid, 28 July, 2005. 
http://www.elpais.com.  
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 Peasants in the Caguán area of Caquetá (see appendix 4) started growing coca in the 
1970s, when a considerable colonisation of the area had already taken place. The FARC 
established a stable presence in the area at the end of the same decade (Jaramillo, 1989: 56), 
and was faced with the dilemma of either banning coca or accepting it. According to Manuel 
Ruíz in Cartagena del Chairá, this coincided with great poverty that had been provoked by 
the drought of 1979, which along with the absence of the state made up an adequate 
economic and natural context for illicit cultivation to take place (Ferro, 2004: 414-16).  
 At the beginning this created a quite chaotic situation, and the FARC entered one of 
its most critical periods when the newly established self defence forces were involved in a 
number of abuses. As a consequence, the forces were closed down and the organisation 
instead started to take direct control over the coca economy through taxations and market 
regulations (Ferro, 2004: 417-19). Security was improved, as the FARC assumed the roles of 
the police and the judiciary. A minimum wage for coca leaf pickers and minimum prices for 
the leaf which middlemen must pay was also established. The public furthermore became 
subject to community rules concerning liquor sales, drug use, hours of operation for 
businesses, hunting and fishing, and staple crops on coca farms (Rangel, 2000: 587). The 
FARC has also organised services of education, health, road construction, and loans to 
farmers and small businessmen (Chernick, 2000: 37).   
 According to a colonist from the Caguán area (Ferro, 2004: 423-4), after 1986 the 
FARC however started becoming more and more careless as to what concerned the 
community, as the organisation concentrated more effort on the military and on economic 
factors. As said by another colonist (Ferro, 2004: 424): when the organised community asked 
for more involvement, this was not taken into account, and the FARC limited itself to charge 
taxes; to the economic management. There have also been atrocities committed towards 
civilians, such as the massacre of seven members of the indigenous Coreguages of the San 
Luís community in July 1997, as reported by Ferro and Uribe (2002: 61).  
 In 1996 an issue of common interest between the FARC and its host societies in the 
Southern Bloc however led to the mobilisation of thousands of cocalero campesinos in the 
cocalero marches (marchas cocaleras). In Putumayo there has not been an integral and 
structured process of development. There is a lack of infrastructure and technical assistance, 
and access to markets is difficult. Also because of fumigations of coca fields in Guaviare and 
Caquetá, there has been an increase in the growing of coca in Putumayo. Peasants have little 
other choice than to grow coca, but they are aware of the problems of this economy.  Indeed, 
they have been asking the government since the end of the 1980s that they be recognised as 
citizens and heard as valid interlocutors, and that their propositions for an alternative licit 
economy involving an integral development and gradual substitution of crops be taken into 
consideration. Instead, the government has been answering with militarisation and aerial 
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fumigations (Betancourt, 2004: 2; Ramírez, p. 3). This again has caused further 
destabilisation of the area, leading to a growing number of internal refugees71.   
 In 1996, in the course of three months, 200 000 peasants were mobilised in the 
cocalero marches, during which the issue of the cocalero campesinos was eventually put on 
the political agenda. The peasants could finally negotiate with the central government and 
the “Pacts of Orito” were signed. For several reasons these pacts, involving alternative 
development plans for the region, were however never properly fulfilled. There was a  
lacking governmental commitment, Plan Colombia was implemented, and paramilitary 
attacks also constituted a serious obstacle (Betancourt, 2004: 3). There is therefore reason to 
believe that recruitment to the guerrillas grew in the aftermath, according to Ferro (2004: 
428). 
 Conversely, in September 2000, the FARC declared an armed strike (paro armado) 
in Putumayo which was not related to popular needs or demands. During such strikes the 
guerrillas occupy the roads and prohibit traffic into and out of town centres. This was only a 
month before the elections to select mayors, governors, municipal councillors, and 
department deputies, and the FARC’s demands were for the State to reject Plan Colombia72 
and to cut back the paramilitary groups in the south. The strike lasted for so long that it led to 
a general rejection of the FARC among the civilian population, to the point that it was lifted 
in the middle of December 2000, although the government had not met any of the demands 
(Ramírez, p. 9). 
 As I have shown, the relationship between the FARC and its host societies in the 
Southern Bloc is one of common interest in some contexts, but not in others. As 
acknowledged by Ramírez (2005: 76), the authority of the FARC is at once accepted and 
resisted. According to González, Bolívar and Vásquez (2003: 57), the colonisers and 
peasants of these regions want to be incorporated into the market and into the State, while 
not necessarily identifying with the political, social and economic project of the FARC. 
Indeed, the FARC does not accept autonomous social or political movements outside its own, 
and the concept of civil society is rejected whenever it includes a relationship to the State 
(Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 129-31). An example of this has been the prohibition of any peasant 
organisation capable of challenging their authority (Ramírez, p. 8).  
 FARC combatants however live according to the same socioeconomic principles that 
the organisation is proposing for the rest of society. They also eat of the food that peasants 
can supply them with, such as bananas, yucca, corn and peas (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 90; 
                                                 
71 See Norwegian Refugee Council: ”Flyktning 2001 Amerika”. 
72 Plan Colombia was approved by U.S. Congress in June 2000, and was presented as a peace plan. 70 
% of its economic aid was however to be spent on military equipment and training for counter-
insurgency and the eradication of coca. It implied widespread aerial sprayings of coca fields. See 
Norwegian Refugee Council, http://www.nrc.no. 
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105-8). The symbiotic economic relationship in the coca growing areas, with all its 
contradictions and complexities, shows us particularly well how this is not a strictly 
economic relationship. The cocalero campesinos, living closely with the guerrillas on an 
everyday basis are not criminalised but accepted by the FARC as legitimate members of the 
community, while at the same time they are silenced whenever they have political ideas 
different from those of the guerrillas. However, as the FARC is the authority they know the 
best, and whom they have depended on, a coca substitution program would certainly need 
the guerrilla group’s participation. This is a typical example of how peace efforts must take 
into account the various forms of social interaction that take place both within the FARC’s 
war system as well as between the latter and civilians. The greed thesis overlooks all of these 
very important aspects, and any peace effort based on it can therefore not be of real use, as it 
might even hurt the civilian population the most73.  
 The FARC’s control over specific territories and the consequent symbiotic type of 
financing, its relative support in these areas and its provision of security and welfare-services 
are all indicators of the FARC inheriting a high degree of institutionalisation of authority. 
The bureaucratic control over resources as well as its rational spending of these add up to the 
latter. The forms of economic activities are indeed related to sustainability concerns rather 
than individual winning or immediate relief. It is also true that robbery does not represent a 
prime economic activity, as looting is banned within the organisation. However, abductions 
or kidnappings make up a considerable part of the FARC’s economic activities. Generally, 
the use of violence is widespread. Although not supported by the majority of the Colombian 
population, the FARC still has potential for recruitment in the coca growing areas, probably 
because of the non-engagement of the state in the area. Moreover, the FARC’s flow of 
resources continues, making it more independent on its host societies’ support. As long as its 
internal legitimacy is strong, more support from the civilian population does not seem to be 
required for the organisation to continue as today.  
 A final aspect that needs to be explored is how the organisational resources and 
economic strength of the FARC affect internal legitimacy. In the next chapter I will therefore 
address the foundations of the FARC’s internal legitimacy as well as its categorisation into 





                                                 
73  I am here referring to specific efforts that have been made so far, such as trying to take away the 
FARCs economic basis by way of fumigation. This hurts poor cocaleros and the environment the 
most, for the FARC has certainly not become any weaker economically as a result of it. 
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CHAPTER V: LEGITIMATION AND LEGITIMACY 
 
In this chapter I will address the sustenance of a Farian identity through the perspective of 
self-legitimation (Barker), as well as establish the grounds that the FARC’s legitimacy is 
based on (Weber). In the first part, I will observe the FARC’s archetypical self-legitimations 
and narratives about the enemy, as well as the secrecy and contradictons that are found 
within both. In the second part,  I will employ my findings from the present and former 
chapters with the purpose of  discovering the bases of the FARC’s internal legitimacy. I will 
do so by way of looking into the organisational resources, type of administration, and the 
way the latter is financed. This will give indications of the FARC’s type of domination. At 
the end of the chapter, I will compare the insights offered by Weber’s ideal categories with 




The conviction of their own authority is intense in the identity of rebels. A select group 
among them is by definition marked off by piety, courage, insight or dedication, 
characterised in a way that stresses their exceptional nature (Barker, 2001: 92-94). The 
rhetorics of the FARC’s existence and of its so-called Farian culture (cultura fariana) first 
and foremost build upon its memory-narratives. The foundational event of the attack on 
Marquetalia is the basis upon which the leadership has elaborated the heroic memory of its 
struggles (Pécaut, 2004: 78)74.  
 Jaime Guaraca75 , recounting the origins of the peasant zones in which the first 
guerrilla groups originated, recounts that the peasants there were “hard working” and 
“united”; that they fought for their land “peacefully”, while at the same time in possession of 
a heritage of “despise for the oppressor”. The department of Tolima (see appendix 1) used to 
be populated by the indigenous tribes of Pijaos and Paeces, whose historical tradition 
according to Guaraca was of war and defence. In Guaraca’s words, the struggle between the 
Pijaos and the Spanish armies had reflected guerrilla warfare. Moreover, most people in 
Tolima are descendents of the Pijaos, and there is little mixture between indigenous and 
white because of the way the Pijaos “recklessly” fought the Spanish (Matta, 1999: 27-33).  
 Guaraca is thus creating or confirming a narrative myth of the first people who 
joined the guerrillas; a myth related to the region they came from (Tolima and its 
                                                 
74 Such memories are of course coloured by the different layers of time and events that have passed 
later in time. The purpose here is however not to discuss whether such a collective narrative based on 
memories is based on the ‘truth’, but to show how the FARC legitimates itself.  
75 It is worth noting here that Jaime Guaraca has been a member of the FARC since its very origins 
and was the second in command of the Secretariat until the beginning of the 1990s.  
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surroundings) and their ancestors (the Pijaos). The narrative of resisting the ‘Operation 
Marquetalia’ must therefore be seen in relationship to this myth; the 48 people attacked by 
the 16 000 soldiers supported by the U.S.A within FARC narrative are not seen as ‘normal’ 
people like you and me, but had a natural propensity in their blood for fighting and resisting 
the ‘oppressor’. The several accounts in Colombian newspapers of Marulanda’s death after 
the attack on Marquetalia in 1964 (Alape, 2000: 19-23), and later proofs of his survival, have 
only strengthened this storyline. The event of the attack on Marquetalia has thus produced a 
discourse much based upon the immortality and heroism of the members of the organisation 
who survived it, and of the unstoppable nature of the organisation as a whole. It is all 
presented as if the ‘just cause’ of the FARC assured its survival and that it will continue to 
do so in the transition towards a ‘perfect society’ as depicted by Marxist thought. This belief 
is further confirmed within the group by such facts as the size of the organisation and the 
status as a political actor during the peace talks with former President Pastrana. 
 The Farian development as presented by its leaders further brings me to accounts of 
particular heroes which, as claimed earlier, fill the language of rebellion. The case of the 
FARC is no exception, and its self-legitimating accounts have gone through stages as a result 
of changes on the international arena, of the changing dynamics of the conflict as such, as 
well as the search for recognition as a political actor (Aguilera, 2003: 4). These accounts at 
their core level contain worship for the family of revolutionary prophets, such as Marx, 
Lenin and Engels, but later also the figure of Che Guevara. After his death in 1967, Che 
Guevara’s thesis of the war of guerrillas, of the continental revolution, the new man, etc. 
were to be seen by the FARC as important theoretical contributions to the revolution in Latin 
America. Within the ranks of the FARC he is depicted as the incarnation of the “perfect 
guerrilla fighter”, a model to imitate, as he is the man who left all commodities in order to 
deliver himself to the revolution. Every 8 October, the day of his death, he is remembered 
and celebrated by all the fronts (Aguilera, 2003:4, 7-8). These heroes and their respective 
thoughts and theories make up the main explanatory frame within which the FARC justifies 
its actions.  
 The FARC also pays reverence to the founding fathers; namely those that are 
directly linked with the foundation of the group, with transcendental episodes or who have 
meant something for the development of the group. There is a mythification in these 
accounts of the organisation’s origins and consequently, of its founding father (Aguilera, 
2003: 4, 9). Marulanda’s role in these narratives cannot be stressed enough, as he organised 
one of the first guerrilla groups in the south of Tolima that created zones of self defence in 
which land was distributed among all of the peasants, and was later to be the Commander in 
Chief of the FARC. The social struggle that took place during the Violence has facilitated 
the rhetoric of an ongoing social struggle that can justify the FARC’s actions within its own 
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ranks. The participation of Manuel Marulanda Vélez in these events has made him belong to 
a legend in which his person and the FARC’s history are part of the same whole.  
 The founding father of course belongs to the select group mentioned above which 
inherits exceptional qualities. Marulanda is seen as the master of the “war of guerrillas”, 
alluding to Che Guevara. Jacobo Arenas also belonged to this group and even continues to 
do so after his death in 1990. In FARC writings, his name is also compared to that of Che 
Guevara, who as we have seen was the “perfect guerrilla fighter”. He is moreover depicted 
as the one who started a more thorough structuring of the group, being a visionary and an 
intellectual (Aguilera, 2003: 11).  
 To this picture of exceptionality belongs the impossibility of making mistakes. When 
the founding father makes mistakes, these are silenced and excused (Aguilera, 2003: 12). 
Thus, as I have mentioned earlier, errors by “the exceptional” are transformed so that they 
will fit the general narrative and identity of the FARC. Marulanda’s faults will hence be 
extremely difficult to identify. An interesting point here is that identifying his mistakes 
would make self-legitimation very difficult to all the members of the group, who actually 
risk their lives for the organisation. Who would believe in the ‘just cause’ if the leader of this 
cause was not just himself? Hence, in the self- legitimation of every single member of the 
FARC, the image of a good and just leader is crucial.  
 Marulanda’s discourse thus becomes important both to his own and to all members’ 
self-legitimation. Commander Fernando Caicedo mentions a particular letter from 
Marulanda to Andrés Pastrana at the time the latter was president as of “obligatory study” 
(Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 43), and this is probably the case for most of his letters and speeches. 
In his speech on the day of the FARC’s 30th anniversary in 1994, he typically recounted the 
story of Marquetalia, of the 16 000 soldiers at war against 48 men, and concluded that the 
responsible for the calamities that the people suffered “today” (i.e. in 1994) were the 
political leaders under the National Front76. Today’s sufferings are hence seen as the result of 
those concrete happenings centred around Marquetalia during the bipartisan power-sharing 
system, happenings in which he himself played a central role; the present situation of war is 
seen by the FARC as an inevitable culmination of past events. The past thus legitimates the 
actions of today, and the FARC is presented as the solution; the one organisation capable of 
achieving the fundamental changes that the country requires in order to stop this suffering. 
The FARC also presents itself as a ‘serious’ organisation, according to Gutiérrez (2003:8). It 
is capable of enforcing its rules, a necessity for the organisation’s effectiveness. Thus, 
summary executions and other strict disciplinary modes of punishment are legitimated by the 
leadership as indispensable.  
                                                 
76”27 de mayo de 1994: 30 años de las FARC-EP: Texto completo del discurso pronunciado por el 
Comandante en Jefe de las FARC-EP”, the FARC’s web page.  
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 In order to fit themselves into their social setting, to appeal to the civilian population 
and their common symbols77 and identity, as we have seen, guerrilla groups have to draw 
claims from the values and governing legitimations of their own society, including those 
belonging to nationalism and patriotism. Moreover, the self-legitimating discourse of a rebel 
group and that of those they seek to overthrow are often mirror images of one another 
(Barker, 2001: 89-91). Interestingly, according to Aguilera (2003: 4), in the case of the 
FARC we also find patriotic heroes, that is, heroes that originate in the early history of the 
country.  
 Such figures were not present to a particularly high degree in the early days of the 
FARC, but were later inspired to emerge by Jaime Bateman, the leader of another guerrilla 
group, the M-19.  He came up with the idea to “nationalise the revolution”, pulling it down 
to the Colombian level, with bambucos, vallenatos and cumbias78, and singing the national 
anthem. He also appealed to the figure of Simón Bolívar, a classical patriotic hero, an appeal 
which inspired the FARC to adopt him as one of its most important heroes. Simón Bolívar 
was hence transformed into a guerrilla fighter alluding to his use of irregular warring 
methods and his struggles against “the oppressors” and “the exploiters”. Tribute thus started 
to be paid to the heroes of independence, and an understanding emerged of an inconclusive 
project of political emancipation initiated by Bolívar that shall be concluded by the FARC. 
 The reverence for national heroes can almost be said to be a mirror image of that of 
the Colombian Army, whose language is filled with moral and patriotic lessons taken from 
the same historical facts, only presented for different purposes. Both the FARC and the 
Army also wear uniforms with the Colombian flag on them (Aguilera, 2003: 15-18). Within 
the FARC, the notion of the home country (patria) is moreover very important. Its code of 
arms appeals to the national tricolour, on top of which there are two crossing rifles under an 
open book. According to the guerrilla fighter “Julio”, this means that Colombia has “taken 
up arms for national liberation”79 (Aguilera, 2003: 18).  
 Regional heroes and legends are also important within the FARC’s narrative. This 
has been another way of approaching greater parts of the Colombian population. These 
heroes may not belong to official Colombian history, but may have deep regional importance. 
The resistance of the indigenous people is again important here, as well as the past struggles 
of the African slaves. Hence, the figure of José Gonzalo Sánchez, an important spokesman 
for indigenous people in the first half of the 20th century is celebrated by the FARC, along 
with for example José Prudencio Padilla, a mulatto who became a general in the wars of 
                                                 
77 I will treat ‘symbols’  as visual and verbal representations of the social order of the FARC and its 
values, goals and history, intended to create unity and coherence.  
78 These are typical Colombian dances.  
79 The exact citation in Spanish is “ (Colombia está) ..alzada en armas por la liberación nacional”, and 
the interview with ”Julio” took place in March 1999.  
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independence. Likewise, the names of numerous fronts in different departments are named 
after regional war heroes, such as Tulio Barón who played an important role in the war of a 
thousand days in Tolima (Aguilera, 2003: 21-2).  
 We also find the figures of the revolutionary brothers, which generally refer to the 
combatants who have died and that are remembered internally by the FARC (Aguilera, 2003: 
4). ‘Brotherhood’ is especially important between the guerrilla fighters, for through it they 
can more easily face the fear of death and feel the value of their own sacrifice. The worship 
is concentrated around those who died during the foundational and mythical event of 
Marquetalia, and those who died during the experience of the Patriotic Union. The 
elimination of the members of the latter is another justifying element for staying at war or 
hardening the FARC’s position towards the State (Aquilera, 2003: 23-4).  
 This use of heroes and symbols, and also the additional name of “People’s Army” 
(Ejército del Pueblo) as was given to the FARC in 1982, have thus been employed in order 
to make the organisation more attractive and possible to identify with for Colombian 
peasants and working people all over Colombia. Importantly, the FARC has managed to 
position itself as the guerrilla group that most clearly originated in the bipartisan violence 
and the loss of belief in the state as a result of that violence (Aguilera, 2003: 15). 
 
Narratives about the Enemy  
 
Equally important for rebels as narrating their own activities, is the demonising depiction of 
the enemy (Barker, 2001:91-4), in this case the paramilitaries and the state particularly. The 
state is described by FARC leaders as ‘bourgeois’ and its rulers as belonging to the 
‘oligarchy’. The latter are dangerous to the community, whereas the FARC gives an image 
of being its protector. 
 If we compare the self-legitimations of the FARC and that of the Colombian Army 
these are indeed similar to one another. Also the images of the enemy are similar in both 
camps, especially when it comes to notions like democracy, violence and social injustice, as 
can be seen from the quotations below. Firstly, Manuel Marulanda at the 30th anniversary of 
the FARC80 pronounced  that  
 
The bourgeois State has been governing for more than 150 years and, until now, it has not 
solved the problems, on the contrary, it has worsened them, we are in the middle of an 
irremediable crisis of the traditional parties, and within the institutions such extremes are found, 
that what the Ministers say does not seem constitutional to the Courts, or that of the Courts is 
not okay with the President. The military high commands do not obey the President, they 
violate the Human Rights; the embezzlements, the underhand dealings, the wastefulness, and so 
                                                 
80 “27 de mayo de 1994: 30 años de las FARC-EP: Texto completo del discurso pronunciado por el 
Comandante en Jefe de las FARC-EP”, the FARC’s web page. 
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many other things that are sufficient for us to become aware that it is not true what they tell us, 
that supposedly they are the saviours and the future of the people; it is history that tells us that 
they have been violent and repressive all their lives in order to maintain their policy and their 
privileges.  
 
As I have claimed above, the FARC presents itself as the only solution for the Colombian 
people. It is therefore important here for Marulanda to stress that the State is not the solution; 
it is not a “saviour” and it is not the “future of the people”. Today Marulanda’s discourse 
against the state is not much changed, it has worsened. On 20 January 2006 Marulanda wrote 
the following81: 
 
Now there comes another experiment of the State, supported by all of those who in different 
ways are annoyed at the peace policies of Pastrana because the objective of demobilising the 
FARC was not succeeded at, and a new chapter of total war is opened against the people who 
fight for better life conditions not from now on but always, according to the past history of 
Colombia. The government, the annoyed, and the war loving bureaucrats were convinced that it 
was the only way of getting rid of the guerrilla and solving not only the social and armed 
conflict but the whole national problem of political, economic, social, cultural and 
environmental character, with the help of the Parliament’s contribution as to its approbation of 
the anti-democratic reforms and laws that would permit Uribe to govern without difficulties for 
four years, with aspirations to govern for four more years spending all the State’s resources 
bribing and mounting in departments and municipalities his unconditional agents as well as 
paramilitaries, network of cooperating people, at the service of the electoral campaign, in order 
to give him continuity in the war that does not exist according to his own words in different 
national and international forums.   
 
Marulanda is referring above to Uribe’s words “there is no conflict”. Uribe namely uttered 
the following at the celebration of the 85th  anniversary of the Colombian Air Forces in 
November 200482:   
 
There is no conflict here, what there is are terrorists, there are no insurgents 83  against a 
dictatorship but terrorists against a democracy. I repeat, there are no insurgents against a 
dictatorship, there are terrorists against a democracy. For the sake of  democracy we have to 
annihilate them. 
 
And later, in the same speech: 
 
These terrorist are the ones who cause the perturbations against the Colombian democracy.  
There have also been guerrillas and insurgency at other latitudes that have been against social 
injustice. Here, the violent ones have deepened social injustice, scared away private companies, 
abolished inversion, slowed down economic growth, condemned Colombians to unemployment, 
to informality, to working without social security, to misery,  to exodus, they have produced 
two million internally displaced persons.  
 
                                                 
81 ”Pastrana - Uribe y sus tres poderes”, letter written to Conservative politician Álvaro Leyva and 
published in the magazine Semana, 28 Feb. 2006.  
82 To be found at the Colombian government’s web page 
http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2004/noviembre/11/16112004.htm, accessed 15 August 2006.  
83 Here he is probably referring not only to the FARC, but also to the ELN. However, the FARC is by 
far the biggest and is seen as Enemy Nr. 1.  
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 It is worth noticing that Uribe is accusing the FARC of exactly the same as he is 
himself accused of by the latter: social injustice, violence, and a threat to democracy. As to 
the notion of terrorism, it is neither unknown within the FARC. The organisation at many 
occasions refer to the war as “Uribe’s  terrorist war”84, and the Secretariat has moreover 
called Uribe a “fascist monster” (monstruo fascista)85. Another similarity in the discourse on 
both sides is the way  the State and the FARC respectively are spoken about as “they” and 
“them”. These denominations automatically create a distance between the one who is talking 
and the one he or she is talking about, neutralising and demonising the other part as being 
only “violent”, “terrorist”, and so on.   
 
Secrecy within the Legitimation of a Farian Identity  
 
As we have seen, rebels need to believe in themselves in order to cultivate loyalty, identity, 
and solidarity. As a rebel group cannot openly proclaim its beliefs in itself, it has to do it 
secretly with the help of symbolism, ritual nomenclature, signs, passwords, oaths, rebel 
songs, etc. (Barker, 2001: 98-9). I will here give a couple of examples of how this is done 
within the FARC. 
 Firstly, important FARC members tend to take on specific names of war, often 
names that are intended to evoke particular feelings, honouring for instance old war heroes. 
We have already seen this with Marulanda or Tirofijo (“Sureshot”), who in fact has two nick 
names considering that his real name is Pedro Antonio Marín (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 113).  
 Nick names have however gone through “a change of rules” along with the general 
development of the organisation. According to Orlando Villanueva, co-author of the book 
Alias y apodos en la historia colombiana which was released in 200586, most nick names 
during The Violence were in fact related to animals. This is the case with Jorge Briceño 
Suárez, member of the Secretariat of the FARC, whose nick name “Mono Jojoy’ was given 
to him when he was still a militiaman. His fellows compared him to a white, fat worm, 
known in the area of La Macarena as ‘Jojoy’. The word ‘mono’ refers to the complexion of 
his hair, which was lighter than that of the average Colombian. According to the same author, 
the situation changes between 1966 and 2005; now, most names of war contain both first and 
last names. He claims that this shows an intention of keeping their real identity secret, while 
at the same time implying respect, appraisal and self esteem within these organisations. He 
                                                 
84 See for instance ”Qué se vaya Uribe, asesino!”, article by Alejandro Martínez at the FARC’s 
webpage.  
85 “40 años de lucha por la paz, la soberanía y la justicia social”,  the FARC’s web page. 
86 “Los alias, algo más que una simple ‘chapa’”, in El País, Cali, 9 Dec., 2005, 
http://www.elpais.com.co. 
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further pledges that within the FARC, the use of nick names that denigrate the person is now 
prohibited.  
 This is very interesting information as to the kind of secretive self-legitimation that 
is used within the FARC- it has risen to a higher level when it comes to its own believing in 
itself and in the seriousness of its cause. The fact that it has created two clandestine 
movements under its direction, cutting its ties with the PCC, has probably also given it more 
independence and self esteem.  
 The media is of course crucial in order to spread FARC propaganda. This also has to 
be done clandestinely; through radio channels, films, the internet, and the magazine 
Resistencia. According to the Mexican newspaper El Universal87 , the FARC’s national 
representative of propaganda is Alfonso Cano, who as we have seen is one of the seven 
members of the Secretariat and very important for the FARC on the ideological ground.  He 
gives directives about what should and should not be said. When the FARC was provided 
with the demilitarised zone in 1998, the organisation created a school of image and sound 
where the guerrillas could learn all the techniques necessary for film production. Films were 
made in order to strengthen the moral of the troops- to strengthen their self-legitimation- but 
also to spread the FARC’s message to the outside world. According to the same source, a 
film called “The Guerrilla Girl” was made last year with the help of a Swedish film team and 
was then freely distributed in Europe. In Colombia it has been distributed clandestinely 
under the brand mark of FARC films. At the FARC’s internet page, a few short films can 
also be found. In these, the national symbols accounted for earlier are very visible, such as 
Colombian music in the background, a huge Colombian flag with its code of arms in the 
middle of it, and a  commander being filmed having a cup of plain Colombian coffee (in 
Colombia called tinto) while talking about the FARC’s  proposal for “policies of peace and 
friendship”.  
 As we have seen, Manuel Marulanda has not had a high profile in the Colombian 
media because he purposely stays away from it; he claims that the media manipulates the 
information available concerning the internal conflict (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 112). This low 
profile may however have contributed to the secrecy and mysticism around himself as a 
person. Moreover, the account of the foundational event of Marquetalia has become 
commonplace among public opinion (Pécaut, 2004: 78), hence he is not in danger of being 
forgotten. He is an exceptional figure, which brings me to exceptionality and space. 
According to Barker (2001: 58), space when it is of difficult access (i.e. guarded by soldiers), 
can proclaim to those within it that they are exceptional. Barker is here referring to the 
palaces of  kings and presidents, but also Marulanda is in a place of very difficult access, 
                                                 
87 ”Producciones FARC presenta...” El Universal, 14 May 2006, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx. 
 64 
only in a different manner. His headquarter  is situated in one of the most remote places of 
Colombia. When Álvaro Leyva visited him in December 200588, it took him three days to get 
there, travelling by plane, car, boat and walking for many hours. The space in question is 
jungle-like and mountainous, guarded by FARC combatants, making it dangerous for a 
regular person to move around in the area. The surroundings are hence a self-legitimating 
factor for the Commander in Chief of the FARC, and so is the mysticism and secrecy around 
his person.  
 
Contradictions Between the Narratives and Reality 
 
According to Aguilera (2003: 15), the FARC has converted into the “original sin” of 
Colombia’s recent history. There is indeed a contradiction between its Marxist-leninist 
doctrinarian theory and its military tactics, which according to Fernán González et al. (2003: 
58) manifest themselves as a “prolonged popular war” which ends up in a sort of 
“embarrassing Maosim”. This contradiction is especially visible when it comes to the 
FARC’s position towards international humanitarian law. When asked about that in an 
interview with the magazine Alternativa in 1998, a FARC commander answered that the 
organisation shared the principles of it, but that these were elaborated for a type of conflict 
between nations (González et al., 2003: 58). Moreover, the organisation claims that the 
concept of civil society managed by international humanitarian law divides the population in 
an artificial manner, as if armed participation in conflict were the only way of contributing to 
it. Hence, the FARC considers those who give information to the enemy, popularly called 
sapos (toads), or those who in some way finance the war, as non-civilians. Death penalty to 
sapos who have put FARC combatants’ lives in danger is even considered necessary  (Ferro 
and Uribe, 2002: 134). When it comes to the application of “revolutionary justice” to people 
who are innocent even in these matters, one commander’s excuse89 is that there are people in 
the intermediate level of direction who do not make consultations before they act, and that 
the problem arises because “it is an organisation made up of human beings” (Ferro and Uribe, 
2002: 60-1).   
 Along with the death penalties, kidnapping is another typical violation of 
international humanitarian law90. Commander Fernando Caycedo, using the more neutral 
                                                 
88 ”Tres días con Tirofijo”, Semana 28 Feb., 2006. 
89 Commander Fernando Caycedo, interviewed by Ferro and Uribe.  
90 Article 3 of  the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 says the following: (…)  
“Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid 
down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, 
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, 
colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following 
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word of “retention” says that there is in fact a justification to it, namely that they must make 
those who have economic power pay taxes in the same way that the State does. The State 
when someone does not pay taxes, puts the person in jail without anyone calling it 
kidnapping or a violation of international humanitarian law (Ferro and Uribe, 2002: 95). 
However, kidnapping is an independent source of income to the FARC; it is not only related 
to the non-payment of such obligatory contributions (Rangel, 2001: 389). Indeed, 
Commander Caycedo’s argument does not account for the hundreds of people not covered 
by their law of taxation91 that are kidnapped every year. 
 Another contradiction within the FARC is that between theory and practice 
(González et al., 2003: 58). Activities related to drug trafficking is one of the concrete 
practices that go against the principles of Marxist-Leninism, because these activities 
necessarily link the organisation to mafia activities and capitalist money makers. 
 The FARC does not want to admit its being involved in drug trafficking, and the 
Central General Staff accordingly expressed the following when its members came together 
in 2000: “Drug trafficking is a phenomenon of globalised capitalism and first and foremost 
of the gringos92. It is not the FARC’s problem. We reject drug trafficking”93. The FARC’s 
official spokesman Raúl Reyes was asked in an interview in 2004 for how long the FARC 
would continue to finance itself with money from drug trafficking, and answered the 
following: “That is not true. The FARC collects taxes from those who commercialise coca, 
from those who produce the basic paste in order to send it abroad. There is no other 
relationship between the FARC and drug trafficking”94. It may seem like this issue is a 
problem even to the self-legitimation of the FARC’s leadership itself, such that links to drug 
traffickers are considered more of an exception than a rule. 
 As we have seen, the FARC has a high degree of organisational effectiveness and 
has  become more mature and intelligent in its self-legitimation. This legitimation is more 
successful within the FARC than outside it, because of difficult questions such as 
                                                                                                                                          
acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons:  
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture; (b) Taking of hostages; (c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; (d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” 
91 The FARC’s Law 002 about taxation has three articles: “1. Collect taxes FOR PEACE from those 
individuals and legal entities, whose patrimony is superior to a million U.S. dollars.  2.  From now 
onwards [March 2000], those covered by this LAW should present themselves in order to attend this 
obligation. A second call will increase the tax amount. 3.  Those who do not attend this requirement 
will be detained. Their liberation will depend on the payment that will be determined.” To be found on 
the FARC’s webpage.  
92 A gringo is a person from the U.S.A. 
93 “Legalizar el consumo de droga. Única alternativa sería para eliminar el narcotráfico”, 24 March 
2000, the FARC’s web page. 
94 ”Entrevista de Yamid Amat a Raúl Reyes”, in El Tiempo, 27 July 2004. 
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international humanitarian law and the FARC’s apparent relationships with drug cartels. 
These questions are however somehow justified in a way that seems to convince most of the 
combatants, who in order to legitimate their own and the group’s actions need to find 
coherence between the memory-narratives, the self-legitimations of the leadership, and their 
own personal experiences.  
 According to Ahonen, (1999), “how far the actual collective historical identity 
conforms with the hegemonial narratives, depends on the critical historical skills of the 
common people”. As we have seen, the educational level among combatants on average is 
quite low. According to Ferro and Uribe (2002: 85) this is a problem for the organisation, but 
I would claim that in a way, it can also be a strength if level of education includes critical 
historical skills. The combination of a well-educated leadership and low critical historical 
skills among the average member can make collective identity easier to shape.  
 The personal experiences of combatants and their sense of reality are also marked by 
what Thoumi (2005: 47) notes as post-traumatic stress, a general problem within the 
Colombian population which has not been treated adequately. He claims that this situation is 
a serious obstacle to solidarity, trust, and the capacity of negotiating peace. He also asks the 
rhetorical question of what effects it might possibly have that most of the leaders of the 
government, the guerrillas and the paramilitary groups have had parents and relatives who 
have been kidnapped or killed, or have been kidnapped, extorted or threatened themselves. It 
seems probable that the latter has effects on FARC combatants’ sense of reality and justice, 
on their feelings of hate, anger, and fear.  
 The spectacular memory-narratives of the FARC most probably give combatants a 
sense of belonging to the continuation of great historical events. Along with feelings of 
brotherhood and those provoked by songs, symbols and secrecy, this gives them a feeling of 
being important, as opposed to a situation known to so many Colombians; that of being 
unemployed 95 . As I have shown, and agreeing with Gutiérrez (2004: 275-6), a crucial 
strength of the FARC is that it does indeed give its members tools to interpret their personal 
experience in an explanatory frame of collective destiny in which self defence is an 
                                                 
95 According to the Colombian government’s department of statistics (Departamento Administrativo 
Nacional de Estadística- DANE), the unemployment rate for 2006-2005 is 11.5. The CIA’s World 
Factbook similarly uses the number of 11.8 for 2005. However, DANE in its survey (Encuesta 
Continua de Hogares- ECN) includes the rate of participation, which for the same year was 59.8. In 
its methodology, to be included in this category a person must undertake at least one hour of paid 
activity per week during the week of reference. Included are also family members who, without 
payment, work at least one hour a week, as well as those persons who did not work during the week of 
reference but all the same had a job.  
On the unemployment rate, see 
http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/ech/ech/bol_espec_may06.pdf; for the CIA’s 
World Factbook; https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/co.html#Econ, on the 
methodology of the unemployment survey, see  
http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/fichas/empleo/ficha_ech.pdf.   
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important historical ingredient. Yet another important factor is the size of the organisation, a 
factor that  serves the function of confirming the combatants’ self-legitimation. It is all the 
more tempting to enter the most successful and biggest group (Gutiérrez, 2004: 271). The 
appeal of military life should also not be underrated, for the power and status of a gun can 
give social advantages. They command attention and respect, which are essential values of 
the FARC’s ‘serious-respectable’ identity (Gutiérrez, 2003:13).  
 We have seen that life as a FARC combatant is hard and risky, and breeches of the 
FARC’s rules are severely punished. The question of whether conviction or fear is the  
reason why so many combatants stay in the organisation is difficult, but it seems to be 
related to average time of service. Deserters are mostly relatively new members of the 
organisation; combatants apparently become more loyal when they have had years of 
learning behind them to cope with guerrilla life (Gutiérrez, 2003:16).  
 
The FARC’s Basis of Legitimacy 
 
Recalling Weber’s understanding of a legitimate order, an order is seen as legitimate by its 
members when action is oriented towards determinable “maxims” regarded by the actor as 
obligatory or exemplary. When the order is seen to define a model, and it is perceived as 
binding, it enjoys ‘legitimacy’.  
 We must therefore look for visible signs of courses of action chosen by the actors 
according to duty and obligation; a far-reaching trend of exemplary behaviour according to 
the ‘maxims’ of the organisation. Clapham’s indicators, employed in chapter 3, are of 
instrumental use in the study of a guerrilla group’s effectiveness. Since these conditions for 
an effective organisation are all in place in the case of the FARC, it is reasonable to conclude 
that there is a belief in legitimacy among the great majority of its members. This belief is 
moreover due to more and more sophisticated self-legitimation and the leadership’s ability to 
exploit historical memory for what it is worth. Without this belief in legitimacy, the given 
domination would not have been able to form a sufficiently reliable basis (Weber, 1968: 213). 
As we have seen, the FARC throughout the last 40 years has been able to form a basis 
reliable enough for the group to grow in number while at the same time staying united and 
effective.  
 If we are to judge further when it comes to signs of duty and obligation, it is worth 
remembering that the combat moral is high, that desertion only happens in the margin, and 
that splits are extremely rare. According to Gutiérrez (2004: 271), the FARC “offers the least, 
and demands the most; however in terms of growth, it is the winner”. A strict materialist 
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would probably rather join the paramilitaries, who impose no strong restrictions, pay salaries 
and allow for looting to take place.  
 Remembering Weber’s three types of authority, namely the legal, the traditional and 
the charismatic, he accordingly describes the ideal types of administration: To legal authority 
corresponds the bureaucracy, to traditional authority corresponds an administrative staff 
based on personal loyalty, and to charismatic authority corresponds the charismatic 
administrative staff composed by followers of the charismatic leader. We have also seen that 
the types of economy corresponding to these types of administration differ between them: 
The bureaucracy is most often paid for through taxation, while the administrative staff based 
on personal loyalty is usually paid for by the ruler himself. The followers of the charismatic 
leader at first share everything according to need, financing themselves through voluntary 
gift. At a later stage, the followers will most probably try to introduce stable salaries. 
 The administrative staff of the FARC is the Central General Staff, which as we have 
seen consists of 25 members. The members of the EMC are appointed at the National 
Conference of the Guerrillas, and they again appoint the Secretariat; hence we can say that 
they are bound to obedience to the latter by an actual belief in their legitimacy. That leads us 
to the question of what grounds this legitimacy is based on, namely rational, traditional or 
charismatic grounds, as well as the question of which type of administrative staff we are 
addressing.  
 The fact that the Conference democratically appoints the EMC, who again appoint 
the Secretariat, on the other hand implies a belief in the authority’s legal right to issue 
commands. The members of the Secretariat can furthermore be replaced, which enhances the 
credibility of such rational grounds. As we have seen, the FARC imposes strong bureaucratic 
and normative constraints over its members. The organisation overwhelmingly prioritises 
bureaucratic interests over individual ones (Gutiérrez, 2004: 268-9), and the officials are 
separated from “the means of production or administration”. The EMC indeed more 
resembles a bureaucracy than it is based on personal loyalty. Remembering that the 
bureaucracy is usually paid for through taxation, we must also note that the FARC 
organisation is indeed partly financed by the latter. Within the FARC, all goods are 
moreover common goods, and nobody is allowed a personal fortune (Ferro and Uribe, 
2002:105). 
 As to traditional authority, “the sanctity of old rules and powers” is not necessarily a 
good description of the FARC’s status quo. The organisation has gone through many 
changes during the years, whereas Marxist thought is still the prevalent point of departure. 
However, the rules based upon this thought are not obeyed primarily because of some 
conservative force of tradition. The rules and norms have rather been transformed to fit 
Colombian reality, and are not always “saint”, if we are to judge by the organisation’s links 
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to capitalist drug traffickers. Moreover, the economy is not driven by an attempt to enlarge 
the ruler’s personal fortune.  
 The legitimacy of the leadership of the FARC is apparently neither based on 
charismatic grounds. Neither Commander in Chief Manuel Marulanda Vélez nor the rest of 
the Secretariat have shown to build their authority on a charismatic style but have rather 
pursued a political course that depends on the collective. However, the validity of charisma 
according to Weber (1968: 242) does not so much depend on a ruler’s particular style as on 
the subjects’ recognition of his genuineness, be it as a warrior hero or as a prophet with 
superhuman qualities. Again, we have to remember the important foundational moment of 
the FARC- the attack on Marquetalia. Those who participated in the resistance are part of a 
narrative in which individual stories and the origins of the organisation have become mixed 
together (Ramírez Tobón, 1994: 18), creating a powerful myth. Manuel Marulanda was 
already a leader in Marquetalia, and is often equated with the history of the organisation. His 
leadership is much based on his position as a legend, which, as we have noted, makes it 
increasingly difficult to identify his mistakes and errors. He is an exceptional figure who is 
highly respected within the organisation. The fact that he was proclaimed “man of the year” 
by the magazine Semana in 1998 proves that he is also seen as exceptional, as  a man of 
influence, within Colombian society. As we have seen, the FARC’ s democratic institution 
of the Conference moreover loses influence when it is not organised often enough. The 
decisions are then taken by the Secretariat, which is headed by Marulanda. 
 It can therefore be concluded that the type of administration within the FARC is 
more bureaucratic than it is charismatic or traditional, and that the grounds on which the 
legitimacy of the leadership is based are also more rational than charismatic or traditional. 
However, there are some charismatic elements connected to the Commander in Chief’s 
person. The organisation at the same time seeks not to make this position too overriding, in 
that it stresses his possible replacement or death in the future as uncomplicated when it 
comes to the organisation’s effectiveness.  
 I have thereby found that the type of domination of the FARC is legal authority with 
some charismatic elements. These elements are indeed important for the general belief in the 
organisation; for Marulanda is seen as unstoppable and immortal. The absence of a clear line 
between him and the organisation may lead to the organisation as being also identified as 
unstoppable by its members. The importance of these charismatic elements represented by 
Marulanda may indeed be greater than the organisation likes to admit. It looks like a 
contradiction that he is portrayed as inseparable from the FARC, while at the same time, his 
future death is considered within the organisation not to become a problem to the 
organisations’s effectiveness. The memories of Marquetalia are extremely important to the 
FARC’s self-legitimation, so what will happen when the principal carrier of these is gone? In 
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my view, his death will at least take away an active ingredient of the organisation’s 
explanatory frame. When all the founding fathers are gone, although they will be 
remembered as heroes, it will perhaps become a greater paradox within the organisation that 
so much time has passed since the organisation was founded, without the arrival of a final 
victory or peace agreement.  
  Barker’s theory of legitimation and its instrumental indicators of the cultivation of a 
rebel identity is different from Weber’s concept of ‘legitimacy’ in that it depicts an activity 
rather than a quality. Looking into this activity, I have been able to show that legitimation 
serves the role of justifying the FARC’s contradictory activities, that a collective identity is 
extremely important, and that particular symbolic aspects are crucial for this identification to 
take place. The most effective self-legitimating arguments of the FARC hence reflect some 
of the most important organisational resources of the organisation. These arguments are 
produced in strategic settings, in which the leaders choose to omit facts and deny or explain 
away all that causes repulsion among civilians. Consequently, self-legitimating arguments 
do not necessarily tell the truth about an organisation. The self-legitimation of leaders 
however performs the function of sustaining and justifying the right to their position, and 
contributes to the subjects’ belief that their order is legitimate. This aspect of self-
justification was not neglected by Weber himself, for he also claimed that every system of 

















In this thesis I have examined the research question of how the organisational resources of 
the FARC relate to and define the organisation’s internal legitimacy. I have drawn on C. 
Clapham’s indicators of organisational resources, on the concept of collective identity, as 
well as  R. Barker’s account of the self-legitimation of rebels in order to cover the FARC’s 
non-economic organisational resources. Its economic resources have been studied through 
Bakonyi and Stuvøy’s perspective of a social order of violence in which economic activities 
are a form of social interaction. I have therefore considered the FARC’s ways of extracting, 
reproducing and distributing economic resources as important to the functioning of the social 
system of the FARC. M. Weber’s theory has been used as a means to systematising the 
grounds of the FARC’s internal legitimacy according to type of domination. The group’s 
organisational resources and self-legitimation provide an understanding of whether a belief 
in legitimacy is present, and of the aspects that most importantly contribute to this belief.  
 I have assumed that organisational effectiveness presupposes a belief in legitimacy to 
exist, because according to Weber, the belief in legitimacy is necessary for the basis of a 
domination to be sufficiently stable and reliable. The FARC’s organisational resources of 
educated members of the Secretariat, a clearly defined political project, common principles 
and goals, effective vertical structures, coherence, and a high level of discipline all contribute 
to organisational effectiveness, according to C. Clapham. They are therefore also indicators 
of the existence of a belief among the subjects of the FARC that their order is legitimate.  
  By way of looking into the FARC’s self-legitimation, I have also found that a great 
contributor to this belief in legitimacy is the FARC’s historical memory. It is a fundamental 
ingredient in its members’ collective identity and therefore one of the FARC’s most 
important organisational resources. The sense of collective destiny namely provides a 
powerful explanatory frame, because personal experiences and memory-narratives are 
merged together in a story line that includes myths of past suffering. Symbolic aspects are 
hence crucial in the upholding of the organisation’s coherence and effectiveness. It seems 
however, that the combatants’ sense of belonging and feelings of loyalty depend on the 
amount of time served in the organisation; that in order to acquire a ‘Farian identity’ years of 
learning are needed. As a result, deserters are mostly relatively new members of the FARC.  
 The leadership of Manuel Marulanda cannot be seen as separate from the 
organisation’s memory-narratives, in which he is presented as the leader who along with his 
47 companions escaped 16 000 soldiers. His symbolic importance for the FARC’s 
effectiveness and internal legitimacy is crucial because he is the protagonist and great hero 
within the organisation’s historical memory. However, the organisation can function without 
him, because he does not alone make the decisions. The Secretariat works through 
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consultations and team work, and the political course is decided when possible by the 
National Conference of the Guerrillas. This dispensability of the FARC’s Commander in 
Chief is also an organisational resource.  
 Yet another organisational resource that I have discovered essential for effectiveness 
and the belief in legitimacy, is the rational use and control of economic resources. Coherence 
between the latter and the collective narrative of the organisation is also crucial. The FARC 
has succeeded at this, to the point that the way of delegating economic resources is related to 
the “revolutionary mysticism” of the organisation. Hence, the FARC has managed to keep 
the economic resources a strength. The members of the group are not motivated by material 
wealth, for they receive none. The centralisation of resources and their fair distribution to the 
fronts are great advantages for internal cohesion to take place. Hence, the handling of 
resources actually fits into the picture of social relationships that the organisation aims at 
internally. This rational and “ideologically correct” handling of resources has probably been 
influenced by the organisational resources of a political project, educated leaders, effective 
structures, and high level of discipline; the latter also contributing to the tight control over 
the finances. The high degree of organisational effectiveness and skilled self-legitimation of 
the leadership seems to convince most of the combatants that there is coherence between the 
FARC’s narratives and courses of action, despite violations of international humanitarian 
law and apparent relations with drug cartels.  
 According to Weber’s typology, the claims to legitimacy made by the FARC’s 
leadership are founded mainly upon rational grounds; on a belief that the person in authority 
has a right to issue commands and that the performed rules are legal. This can be concluded 
from the FARC’s internal structures- the Conference, the Central General Staff and the 
Secretariat are organisms to which the members are elected democratically. However, 
Manuel Marulanda Vélez has never failed to be elected to the Secretariat, and his exceptional 
character and merits give way also to a belief in the FARC’s legitimacy upon grounds other 
than rational, namely charismatic. He is seen as a legend, a warrior hero, someone who “does 
not make mistakes” within the organisation. Hence, a variety of ascriptions to legitimacy 
determines the submission to the order, although rational grounds prevail. Regardless of 
whether ideology or military strategy is regarded as most important by its subjects, and 
regardless of the degradation of the conflict as such, a belief in legitimacy exists. We have 
seen that the organisation takes increasingly more effort on the economic and military part, 
and that increased economic resources have translated into more military strength.  
 In this thesis I have shown that the most effective self-legitimating arguments of an 
organisation may reveal its most important organisational resources, in this case exemplified 
by the FARC’s historical memory. Through the perspective of the FARC’s economic 
activities as social interaction I have also shown that the way in which resources are handled 
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has symbolic importance and affects internal cohesion, and that there is hardly room for 
personal winning among FARC combatants. The symbiotic type of financing that exists in 
the FARC’s strongholds, the organisation’s relative support in these areas and its provision 
of security and welfare-services moreover indicate the FARC’s high degree of 
institutionalisation of authority. 
 The insight on these matters is extremely important in the search for conflict 
transformation, for in order to transform something it is necessary to know what that 
something is. Therefore, this case study shows the importance of looking into each actor and 
their dynamics. I have shown how the organisational resources of the FARC reflect an order 
whose legitimacy is based on mostly rational, partly charismatic grounds. Those rational 
grounds may be a future platform for transformation into a different system within the 
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Adapted from an interactive map from Especiales online: “Ataques de las FARC.” 
http://www.semana.com.  
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Appendix Nr. 3: The Department of Tolima 








Source: Instituto Geográfico Agustin Codazzi. Marquetalia has been added to map.  
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